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PATHETIC ARGUMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Jamal Greene 
Pathetic argument, or argument based on pathos, persuades 
by appealing to the emotions of the reader or listener. In Aristotle’s 
classic treatment, it exists in parallel to logical argument, which 
appeals to deductive or inductive reasoning, and ethical argument, 
which appeals to the character of the speaker. Pathetic argument 
is common in constitutional law, as in other practical discourse—
think of “Poor Joshua!”— but existing accounts of constitutional 
practice do not provide resources for understanding the place of 
and limitations upon such appeals when they appear in judicial 
opinions. This Article begins to fill that gap. Pathetic argument is 
one of the acceptable modes of persuasion that constitutional 
argument shares with other deliberative domains, though at its 
best it can be used to amplify arguments within the set of 
discourses—text, history, structure, precedent, and consequences—
that make constitutional law a distinctive form of politics. 
Normatively, appeals to emotion are most easily justified in 
opinions that seek to declare rather than apply law; in separate 
writings; when addressed to accepted subjects of constitutional 
argument rather than the ultimate outcome in the case; and when 
they arouse other-regarding rather than self-regarding emotions. 
A nuanced account of the proper place of pathetic argument in 
constitutional law is instrumental to understanding what it means 
to engage, and not to engage, in constitutional discourse. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Much successful constitutional argument is, in a classical sense, 
pathetic. A pathetic argument is one that appeals to pathos, or emotion. 
Persuasion may result, Aristotle wrote, “[W]hen [the hearers] are led to 
feel emotion by the speech; for we do not give the same judgment when 
grieved and rejoicing or when being friendly and hostile.”1 Pathos is one of 
several modes of persuasion in law, as in other practical discourse, and 
may be especially so in constitutional law, whose successful elaboration 
must align with our deepest commitments. A commitment whose 
evocation fails to stir emotion among the committed is unlikely to have 
been very deep. 
                                                 
1. Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse bk. 1, ch. 2, § 5 (George A. 
Kennedy trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (n.d.) (alteration omitted). 
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And yet one detects an unexamined ambivalence toward the 
appropriate role of emotion in constitutional discourse. Taxonomists of 
constitutional argument, even those whose project is descriptive, typically 
ignore or dismiss emotional appeal as a standard mode of persuasion in 
constitutional law. Philip Bobbitt, for example, devotes less than one 
sentence in his Constitutional Fate to “pathetic” argument, writing that it 
“has to do with the idiosyncratic, personal traits and thus reflects one 
feature of illegitimate judicial opinions which is often confounded with 
[ethical argument].”2 Bobbitt’s concern appears to be that invoking pathos 
in a constitutional case requires the judge to individuate decisionmaking 
that should properly be general. The same basic concern animated 
objections to President Obama’s invocation of “empathy” and 
“compassion” as desirable traits in a Supreme Court Justice.3 As the 
majority opinion stated in Roe v. Wade, “Our task, of course, is to resolve 
the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of 
predilection.”4 
The author of that opinion, Justice Blackmun, would later write, 
dissenting in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 
that “compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging.”5 That 
statement appears just before what has become the canonical example of 
pathos in a judicial opinion. The DeShaney Court held that a state agency 
that failed to adequately investigate reports of child abuse could not be 
held liable under the Due Process Clause for resulting injuries to the child, 
Joshua DeShaney. Justice Blackmun began his final paragraph thus: 
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, 
bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by 
respondents who placed him in a dangerous predicament and 
who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially 
nothing except, as the Court revealingly observes, “dutifully 
recorded these incidents in [their] files.” It is a sad commentary 
upon American life, and constitutional principles—so full of late 
of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about “liberty and 
justice for all”—that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned 
to live out the remainder of his life profoundly retarded.6 
                                                 
2. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 95 (1982) [hereinafter 
Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate]. 
3. See infra text accompanying notes 89–100 (presenting President Obama’s 
statements that judges’ empathy and experiences assist in justice and criticism of those 
statements). 
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (emphasis added); see Terry A. Maroney, The 
Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 629, 633 (2011) (“[J]udicial 
dispassion has come to be regarded as a core requirement of the rule of law . . . .”). 
5. 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
6. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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Anger, sadness, guilt, and shame are all in play in Justice Blackmun’s 
opinion, drafted in his own hand.7 The individuation of Joshua DeShaney, 
the appeal drawn from his idiosyncratic, personal traits, is deliberate and 
effective. 
Which Justice Blackmun—the one in Roe or the one in DeShaney—was 
true to the practice of constitutional law? Which Justice Blackmun was 
true to its aspirations? These questions form this Article’s subject.  
There is an insightful but surprisingly small literature on the related 
but quite distinct question of the role of emotion in judicial 
decisionmaking.8 Legal realists such as Jerome Frank and Arthur Corbin 
wrote of what they believed to be the inevitable influence of emotion as a 
constitutive element of a judge’s personhood, and therefore of the 
decisions he reached.9 More recently, Richard Posner has argued that 
emotion invariably contributes to decisionmaking under uncertainty, for 
judges as for others.10 Martha Nussbaum and Terry Maroney, among 
others, have emphasized the compatibility between emotion and 
substantive rationality; on these accounts, what Maroney calls the 
“cultural script of judicial dispassion” does affirmative damage to the legal 
decisional process.11  
These discussions have focused predominantly on the judge as an 
object of emotional argument, the pathetic appellee as it were. Still less has 
been written of the distinct role of a judge as a producer rather than a 
recipient of emotional appeals. Law and literature scholars have 
approached law as a form of rhetoric, but have not much integrated their 
                                                 
7. See Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun: Harry Blackmun’s Supreme 
Court Journey 230–31 (2005) (including reproduction of Blackmun’s draft). 
8. A helpful summary of this scholarship appears in Maroney, supra note 4, at 652–64. 
9. See Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 119 (Anchor Books 1963) (1930) 
(“The peculiar traits, disposition, biases and habits of the particular judge will . . . often 
determine what he decides to be the law.”); Arthur L. Corbin, The Law and the Judges, 3 Yale 
Rev. 234, 250 (1914) (“Law is not logic, nor does reason play the chief part in its creation. It 
grows in the semi-darkness of ignorance and emotion, it is based upon racial experience, 
and it represents the custom and the interest and the desire of the average man.”); see also 
Theodore Schroeder, The Psychologic Study of Judicial Opinions, 6 Calif. L. Rev. 89, 96 
(1918) (describing judicial decisions as “revelation of the emotions, the phantasies, the 
desires, the persistent past life and the present intellectual status of the judge”). 
10. See Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 105–10 (2008) [hereinafter Posner, 
Think]. 
11. Maroney, supra note 4, at 633 (calling idea of judicial dispassion 
“counterproductive” because it “undervalues what judicial emotion might bring to the table 
and enfeebles our ability deliberately to channel emotion in service of good judging”); see 
also Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 
Colum. L. Rev. 269, 273–78 (1996) (defending “evaluative conception” of role of emotion in 
criminal law jurisprudence, which posits “emotions express cognitive appraisals” that can be 
both “morally evaluated” and improved through “moral education”). See generally Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (2001) [hereinafter 
Nussbaum, Upheavals] (elaborating view of emotions as cognitive appraisals connecting 
one’s external environment to one’s significant commitments). 
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accounts with those offered within more mainstream constitutional 
scholarship.12 Criminal law scholars have written of the special place of 
emotional appeals in assessing criminal culpability and calibrating 
punishment.13 To the degree most legal academics have considered the 
role emotional appeals play or should play in constitutional argument, 
they have largely assimilated their analysis to an assessment of the role of 
emotion in judicial decisionmaking, or else simply assumed that such 
appeals fall self-evidently outside the judicial role. 
Taking pathetic argument in constitutional law as a sui generis 
subject, this Article challenges those assumptions both descriptively and 
normatively. If anything is self-evident, it is that appeals to pathos are an 
important element of constitutional practice. Yet the dominant typologies 
of constitutional argument do not provide resources for understanding or 
legitimating those appeals. Our ability to identify features of argument that 
are special to constitutional law is said to constrain and, therefore, to 
define constitutional law as a distinctive form of politics.14 Bobbitt 
famously described six archetypes of constitutional argument: historical, 
textual, structural, doctrinal, prudential, and ethical.15 But to cite just one 
clear example of pathetic argument, Justice Kennedy, dissenting in 
Stenberg v. Carhart, matter-of-factly describes a so-called partial birth 
abortion by saying, “The fetus, in many cases, dies just as a human adult or 
child would: It bleeds to death as it is torn limb from limb.”16 Justice 
Kennedy’s gruesome description of the procedure, designed deliberately 
                                                 
12. See generally James Boyd White, Heracles’ Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics 
of the Law (1985) [hereinafter White, Heracles’ Bow] (developing conception of law as 
rhetorical process); Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 Yale J.L. & 
Human. 201 (1990) (applying insights from literary criticism to appellate judicial opinions). 
13. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 361, 390–412 (1996) [hereinafter Bandes, Empathy] (applying normative theory 
of emotional appeals in law to use of victim impact statements); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra 
note 11, at 305 (arguing “quality of . . . offenders’ emotion is one consideration that matters 
in substantive criminal law”); Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engaging Capital 
Emotions, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 355, 356–61 (2008), available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/17/LRColl2008n17Berman
&Bibas.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (seeking to recover space for overt 
appeals to emotion in capital context). 
14. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 6 (discussing United States’ 
unique “legal grammar” and its role in constitutional interpretation); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A 
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 
1194 (1987) [hereinafter Fallon, Constructivist Coherence] (finding five main categories of 
argument and authority in constitutional debate); cf. Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1325, 1333 (1984) (“The person who looks about and sees . . . a field already organized 
by problems, impending decisions, . . . etc. is not free to choose or originate his own 
meanings, because a set of meanings has . . . already chosen him and is working itself out in 
the actions . . . he is even now performing.”). 
15. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 3–119; Philip Bobbitt, 
Constitutional Interpretation 12–13 (1991) [hereinafter Bobbitt, Constitutional 
Interpretation] (listing modalities of constitutional argument). 
16. 530 U.S. 914, 958–59 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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to disgust and to shame the audience, masquerades as a cold recitation of 
facts but is integral to the opinion’s rhetorical mission.  
It is difficult to fit this practice neatly into what Bobbitt calls the 
“modalities” of constitutional argument.17 It is prudential in the sense that 
it means to alert the reader to the social and moral consequences of 
invalidating the state’s ban on the procedure. But much constitutional 
argument, including argument squarely identified with other modalities, is 
prudential if by the label we mean only that it contemplates consequences 
for our social and moral life. Justice Kennedy’s tactics in Stenberg 
constitute ethical argument in the sense that Kennedy’s grounds for 
persuasion are rooted in a communal morality; he is advancing what 
Richard Fallon would call a “value” argument.18 But Bobbitt does not mean 
to conflate ethical argument with moral argument; ethical argument in his 
usage rather harkens to the classical identification of ethos as a rhetorical 
mode grounded in the character of the speaker, here the character of the 
American people as embodied in their constitutional arrangements.19 
The best way to understand the function of Justice Kennedy’s pathetic 
appeal is not as an archetype of argument in itself, analogous to historical, 
textual, and so on, but rather as a mode of persuasion. Pathetic argument 
in constitutional law attends to and manipulates the reader’s emotions in 
order to persuade her either as to the ultimate adjudicative outcome or as 
to the substance or valence of established “modalities.” The key, then, to 
understanding the role of pathetic argument in constitutional law lies in 
distinguishing subjects of argument from forms of rhetoric. What makes 
constitutional law special is that its theater of argument is confined largely 
to text, structure, history, doctrine, and consequences. What makes 
constitutional argument continuous with other forms of practical 
discourse is that it employs the same basic tools of persuasion with 
respect to those subjects: logos (appeals to logic), ethos (appeals to the 
speaker’s character), and pathos (appeals to the listener’s emotions). 
Identifying the persistent role of pathos (or indeed ethos and logos) in 
constitutional argument does not by itself answer the normative question. 
There are several reasons to believe, however, that pathetic argument is at 
least sometimes an appropriate mode of persuasion in constitutional law. 
First, whether or not pathetic argument can be eliminated from 
constitutional law, it is in fact an established part of constitutional practice. 
Constitutional law depends on a substantial measure of popular 
acceptance for its legitimacy, and we have come to identify at least some 
arguments in the pathetic mode as an accepted constitutional form. 
Second, and significantly, constitutional adjudication at the appellate level 
                                                 
17. Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 15, at 12. 
18. Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 14, at 1205 (“[V]alue arguments assert 
claims about what is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, as measured against some 
standard that is independent of what the constitutional text requires.”). 
19. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 94. 
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approaches a form of lawmaking in hard cases. It eschews error-correction 
and self-consciously seeks to establish rules and standards of prospective 
and general application.20 Lawmaking is not merely conventionally 
understood as tolerating emotional appeals; rather, pathetic argument is 
essential to lawmaking because emotion is integral to public morality. 
Popular legitimation of constitutional adjudication requires judges to 
recognize, adapt to, and perhaps even shape the emotional responses of 
their audience. At each rung of the appellate ladder, pathetic argument 
becomes attributable ever less to bias and ever more to social awareness. 
Communicating this awareness improves both the democratic 
responsiveness and the administrability of constitutional rules. Finally, 
pathetic argument is unavoidable. Of course, that some phenomenon is 
inevitable does not mean we should not seek to minimize its destructive 
effects. But it does place the burden of persuasion on those who would 
argue, in the face of professional evolution, that pathetic argument is never 
appropriate. 
Pathetic argument, like other forms, is context-specific. Overt appeals 
to emotion are often inappropriate in constitutional argument, as 
elsewhere in the law, and the appropriateness of such appeals necessarily 
depends on the subject of the argument and the nature of the emotions 
involved. It is not possible to impose a fixed dichotomy that specifies, by 
rule, when pathetic argument is acceptable and when it is not, but we can 
identify a set of factors likely to influence that judgment. First, it is useful 
to distinguish emotional appeals in the service of an accepted subject of 
constitutional argument from those that pertain solely to the ultimate 
issue in the case. Modes of persuasion may, but need not, modify the 
standard constitutional subjects. Thus, we can imagine pathetic historical 
argument—see, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s recitation of John 
Greenleaf Whittier’s patriotic ballad “Barbara Frietchie” in his Texas v. 
Johnson dissent 21—just as we can imagine pathetic argument simpliciter: 
“We should permit prohibitions on partial birth abortions because the 
procedure is offensive and disgusting.” Pathetic argument as to the 
ultimate issue fits less easily into the traditions of constitutional practice. 
In addition to the subjects of pathetic constitutional argument, we 
might also wish to know the kinds of emotion being invoked. Under the 
now-dominant “cognitive theory” of emotions, our feelings are not 
necessarily impulsive and ad hoc but often reflect a rational response to 
information about the world.22 We are motivated to respond to external 
                                                 
20. See Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related 
Matters, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 665, 683–85 (2012) (“While still frequently engaged in what we 
could regard as little more than ordinary dispute resolution, the supreme Court’s law 
declaration function has long since assumed overriding importance.”). 
21. 491 U.S. 397, 424–25 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
22. See infra Part II.A (discussing feeling and cognitive theories of emotion respectively 
defining emotions as associated with specific physical sensations or particular objects of 
evaluation). 
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stimuli not by logos but by pathos, and motivated action is necessary to the 
vitality of constitutional law.23 Emotions such as love, anger, or shame 
may produce both deliberation about the content of our commitments and, 
just as important, action in the service of that deliberation. Emotions such 
as jealousy, vengeance, or disgust might be less likely to produce 
normatively desirable action.24 Or the opposite may be true.25 Or it may 
just depend on context. In any event, it is worth doing the work needed to 
distinguish more from less productive emotion-generated responses.  
Other factors that might be relevant to whether pathetic argument is 
appropriate include, as suggested above, whether the court’s role in a case 
is better characterized as law-applying or law-announcing and whether 
the writer is speaking for the court or solely for himself or a subset of the 
court. Eccentricity in separate writing does less to damage the reputation 
of the court, and dissenting opinions are, often self-consciously, efforts at 
law reform. The closer the judge is to being an advocate, possessed of a 
distinct role morality, the more license the judge may have to employ the 
standard tools of legal advocates. Those tools have long included “jury 
arguments,” so called even when they are presented to judges.26 
This Article proceeds largely as outlined above. Part I introduces the 
Peripatetic concept of pathos and identifies the traditional discomfort with 
pathetic argument in constitutional law. Part II defines emotional appeals 
and fits pathetic argument into existing accounts of constitutional 
methodology, specifically those of Bobbitt and Fallon. Part III makes the 
normative case for recognizing a role for pathetic argument in 
constitutional law. Part IV assesses the epistemic and practical purchase of 
identifying and accepting this approach to constitutional argument.  
Appeals to logos and to ethos are relatively hierarchical approaches to 
legal persuasion. Privileging recourse to logic over appeals to emotion 
rewards higher education, formal language acquisition, and symbolic 
thinking. Privileging ethical over pathetic appeal presupposes shared 
reputational markers and implies an established cultural hegemony. 
Critical theorists have long resisted legal formalism partly on these 
                                                 
23. Cf. Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and 
Judicial Review 145–206 (2004) (describing ways in which “people out of doors” influenced 
constitutional development through nineteenth century). 
24. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law 124–
71 (2004) (criticizing disgust’s role in creating legal norms). 
25. See Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust, in The Passions of 
Law 63–65 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (defending disgust as expressive emotion in criminal 
law); Robert C. Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance: On Law and the Satisfaction of Emotion, in 
The Passions of Law, supra, at 123, 124 (“[J]ustice itself is (in part) a matter of emotion 
and . . . the desire for vengeance is basic to its concerns.”); Dan M. Kahan, What Do 
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591, 630–52 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan, 
Alternative Sanctions] (advocating shaming as appropriate alternative sanction); Eric A. 
Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 Geo. L.J. 1977, 1999 (2001) (arguing feelings of disgust 
are unlikely to interfere with juror deliberations).. 
26. See infra note 88. 
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grounds.27 Identifying established pathetic practice, developing quality 
controls, and thereby more generally recovering a legitimate space for 
pathetic constitutional argument may help to address some of these 
concerns even as they give rise to others. Attention to pathos, and 
therefore to audience, in constitutional law carries the familiar risks that 
attach to protestant approaches to constitutional construction.28 To the 
degree these risks are merely the wages of self-understanding, they are 
risks worth taking. 
I. THE PROBLEM WITH PATHOS 
Persuasion is vital to law and to democratic governance. The 
importance of persuasion within these domains is precisely what led the 
Ancient Greeks, the earliest democrats, to systematize and codify the 
forms of rhetoric.29 Indeed, among Aristotle’s chief contributions was his 
generalization of familiar concepts in legal rhetoric to nonlegal domains.30 
In so doing, he emphasized the nonemotional, logical elements of 
rhetoric.31 This Part discusses the very different modern American 
understanding of pathetic argument as an element of legal and 
constitutional practice. While emotional appeal remains a significant and 
much discussed approach to legal argument across several areas, it is 
generally dismissed as irrelevant or subversive in constitutional law and in 
judicial practice more generally. 
A. The Classical Conception 
Its antiquity notwithstanding, Aristotle’s treatise On Rhetoric is the 
seminal work on the art of persuasion. It is dissected, criticized, and 
defended in modern courses on rhetoric, and a rhetorician’s relative 
                                                 
27. See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 42 (1983) 
[hereinafter Cover, Foreword] (“[T]o state the problem [to which courts respond] as one of 
unclear law or difference of opinion about the law seems to presuppose that there is a 
hermeneutic that is methodologically superior to those employed by the communities that 
offer their own law.”); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of 
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 785 (1983) (challenging liberal 
embrace of interpretivism and neutral principles on grounds that “only coherent basis for 
their requisite continuities of history and meaning is found in the communitarian 
assumptions of conservative social thought”). 
28. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 29 (1988) (describing “protestant” 
approach to constitutional interpretation as “based on the legitimacy of individualized (or at 
least nonhierarchical communal) interpretation” as opposed to “catholic” position that 
views Supreme Court as “dispenser of ultimate interpretation”). 
29. See George A. Kennedy, Introduction to Aristotle, supra note 1, at 7–8 [hereinafter 
Kennedy, Introduction] (describing occasions for use of civil rhetoric). 
30. See id. at 9 (noting Aristotle criticized handbooks for concentration on judicial 
situations). 
31. See id.; see also Aristotle, supra note 1, bk. 1, ch. 1, §§ 3–4 (“[P]ity and anger and 
such emotions of the soul do not relate to fact but are appeals to the juryman.”). 
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affinity with Aristotle continues to be her central defining characteristic.32 
On Rhetoric identifies three pisteis, or modes of persuasion, already 
discussed in brief: “[S]ome are in the character of the speaker [ēthos], and 
some in disposing the listener in some way [pathos], and some in the 
argument itself, by showing or seeming to show something [logos].”33  
For Aristotle, then, persuasion depends importantly on the quality of 
the inductive and deductive reasoning present in the argumentation (i.e., 
logos), but it also depends on the speaker’s success at demonstrating his 
reputation and integrity (i.e., ethos) and on his skill at arousing the 
emotions of his audience in favor of his position and against the position of 
his opponent (i.e., pathos). A speaker must appear to have practical 
wisdom, virtue, and good will, thereby establishing a measure of ethical 
authority.34 For Aristotle, that authority was reflected in and thereby 
emerged from the content of the speech—whether it was “spoken in such a 
way as to make the speaker worthy of credence”—rather than from pre-
existing reputational markers such as wealth or status.35 This 
understanding of ethical argument differs from that of many of its modern 
discussants, but it was a crucial point for Aristotle, who believed ethos to 
be “almost, so to speak, the controlling factor in persuasion.”36 
Aristotle devoted ten chapters of On Rhetoric to emotional appeal.37 
He defined emotions as “those things through which, by undergoing 
change, people come to differ in their judgments,”38 and so these chapters 
offer primers on how a speaker arouses, within the listener, seven dyadic 
sets of emotions or moods: anger or calmness; friendliness or enmity; fear 
or confidence; shame or shamelessness; kindliness or unkindliness; pity or 
indignation; envy or emulation.39 For example, after describing numerous 
circumstances that tend to cause someone to be angry (e.g., “if someone 
works against him and does not cooperate with him”40 or when others 
“speak badly of, and scorn, things [he] take[s] most seriously”41), Aristotle 
concludes the chapter on anger by saying, “[I]t is clear that it might be 
needful in speech to put [the audience] in the state of mind of those who 
are inclined to anger and to show one’s opponents as responsible for those 
things that are the causes of anger.”42 In the chapter on fear, he writes, 
                                                 
32. See George A. Kennedy, Prooemion to Aristotle, supra note 1, at ix–x (describing 
influence of Aristotelian rhetoric on modern rhetoric theorists). 
33. Aristotle, supra note 1, bk. 1, ch. 2, § 3. 
34. See id. bk. 2, ch. 1, § 5 (noting speaker with all these qualities will be “necessarily 
persuasive to the hearers”). 
35. Id. bk. 1, ch. 2, § 4 (footnote omitted). 
36. Id. 
37. See id. bk. 2, chs. 2–11. 
38. Id. ch. 1, § 8. 
39. See id. chs. 2–11. 
40. Id. ch. 2, § 9. 
41. Id. § 13. 
42. Id. § 27. 
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“[W]henever it is better [for a speaker’s case] that they [i.e., the audience] 
experience fear, he should make them realize that they are liable to 
suffering; for [he can say that] others even greater [than they] have 
suffered.”43 
Aristotle sought to disclaim exclusive or predominant reliance on 
pathos as a mode of persuasion, but he conceded its significance. His 
emphasis on pathetic argument maps onto his conception of rhetoric as 
attuned not just to speaker (hence, ethos) and subject (hence, logos), but 
also to audience (hence, pathos). The neo-Aristotelian philosopher Chaim 
Perelman, in his well-known treatise The New Rhetoric, writes, “The great 
orator, the one with a hold on his listeners, seems animated by the very 
mind of his audience.”44 Plato dismissed the sophists for pandering to the 
crowd, but Aristotle, even as he shared Plato’s criticisms, was a more 
practical man. “[N]o orator, not even the religious orator,” Perelman 
writes, “can afford to neglect this effort of adaptation to his audience.”45 
B. Pathos in Modern Legal Practice 
“Emotion pervades the law,”46 Susan Bandes writes, and there are 
indeed legal contexts in which the use of emotional appeals is openly 
acknowledged as legitimate and even celebrated. The most ready 
examples emerge from criminal law. Our assessment of the gravity of 
particular offenses and our sentencing practices reflect moral judgments 
that may be inseparable from the emotions those judgments both validate 
and produce.47 Thus, capital punishment relies on a theory of retribution 
that seems to require emotionally attuned moral judgments about whether 
death is deserved, or whether it is appropriate to express the community’s 
outrage through the use of its ultimate sanction. We permit jurors to hear 
evidence of the emotional impact on the victim’s family at the sentencing 
phase of capital trials in order to “counteract[] the mitigating evidence 
which the defendant is entitled to put in.”48 The sentencing phase thereby 
becomes a deliberate effort to persuade the juror to internalize the pain 
and suffering experienced by the victim’s family or to grant mercy to the 
                                                 
43. Id. ch. 5, § 15. 
44. Ch. Perelman & L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on 
Argumentation 24 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 
1969) (1958). 
45. Id. 
46. Susan A. Bandes, Introduction to The Passions of Law, supra note 25, at 1 
[hereinafter Bandes, Introduction]. 
47. See Berman & Bibas, supra note 13, at 355–56 (arguing emotion is unavoidable in 
capital punishment context); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 11, at 270 (asserting emotions 
are ubiquitous in criminal law and judgments of whether emotion is “reasonable” may 
influence legal assessment). 
48. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 
496, 517 (1987) (White, J., dissenting)). 
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defendant in contemplation of the social benefits of his continued 
existence or out of sympathy toward those his death would affect. 
In Payne v. Tennessee, the case in which the Court permitted such 
evidence,49 the sentencing jury heard testimony from the victim’s mother 
recounting her young grandchild Nicholas’s response to the murder of his 
mother, Charisse, and sister, Lacie Jo: 
He cries for his mom. He doesn’t seem to understand why she 
doesn’t come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to 
me many times during the week and asks me, Grandmama, do 
you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I’m worried about 
my Lacie.50 
In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor said: 
There is nothing you can do to ease the pain of any of the 
families involved in this case. . . . But there is something that you 
can do for Nicholas.  
Somewhere down the road Nicholas is going to grow up, 
hopefully. He’s going to want to know what happened. And he is 
going to know what happened to his baby sister and his mother. 
He is going to want to know what type of justice was done. He is 
going to want to know what happened. With your verdict, you 
will provide the answer.51 
Rebutting the defendant’s closing argument, the prosecutor continued: 
No one will ever know about Lacie Jo because she never had the 
chance to grow up. Her life was taken from her at the age of two 
years old. So, no there won’t be a high school principal to talk 
about Lacie Jo Christopher, and there won’t be anybody to take 
her to her high school prom. And there won’t be anybody there—
there won’t be her mother there or Nicholas’ mother there to kiss 
him at night. His mother will never kiss him good night or pat 
him as he goes off to bed, or hold him and sing him a lullaby.52 
For his part, the defendant presented testimony from a woman who 
stated that he “was a very caring person, . . . that he devoted much time 
and attention to her three children,” and that her children “had come to 
love him very much and would miss him.”53 
The rhetorical mode of both the prosecutor, overtly, and Payne’s 
attorney, more subtly, was pathetic. The arguments violated neither 
governing statues nor ethical rules and, after Payne, neither did they 
violate the Constitution. Indeed, one of the aggravating circumstances for 
imposition of the death penalty in Tennessee, as in many other states, is 
                                                 
49. The Payne Court overruled Booth and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 
(1989), which had held that admission of victim-impact evidence and argument at a capital 
sentencing trial violated the Eighth Amendment. 
50. Payne, 501 U.S. at 814–15. 
51. Id. at 815. 
52. Id. at 816. 
53. Id. at 814. 
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whether the crime was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”54 
Persuading a jury that a crime fits this description without appealing to the 
jurors’ emotions is a neat trick that no one seriously expects prosecutors 
to accomplish.55 As the Payne Court said, defending the use of victim-
impact evidence, “[T]he testimony illustrated quite poignantly some of the 
harm that Payne’s killing had caused.”56 
Argumentation involving victim-impact evidence or death penalty 
mitigation is not the only place where emotional appeal is a legitimate 
element of criminal practice. Pleas for mercy based on childhood trauma, 
dependent partners and children, good deeds, amicability, or other factors 
liable to arouse the judge’s sympathy or pity are commonplace in criminal 
sentencing. Outside the sentencing realm, gradation of criminal culpability 
more generally requires an assessment of the defendant’s state of mind, 
and so evidence related to the nature of any potential provocations or 
possible grounds for sympathy or insanity are often admissible in criminal 
trials.57 Defendants seeking to arouse contempt based on the provocative 
actions of the homicide victim often advance an imperfect self-defense, 
available at common law to defendants who committed a homicide out of a 
good-faith belief that their life was in danger.58 Battered woman syndrome 
is one version of this defense.59 Defenses of “honor” or “heat of passion” 
                                                 
54. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5) (2012); see also Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory 
Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 345, 364 (1998) (noting most states 
with capital punishment use version of heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravator). The 
Supreme Court has long required states to adopt a narrowing construction of this 
aggravating factor in order to ensure that it is not so open-ended as to be arbitrary. See 
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654 (1990) (finding construction of state statute sufficiently 
narrow to meet constitutional muster), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584 (2002); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255–56 (1976) (same). For example, the 
Tennessee instruction qualifies the aggravator in a typical way, with the phrase “in that it 
involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death.” Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5); see also State v. Brogdon, 457 So. 2d 616, 630 (La. 1984) 
(noting to apply aggravating factor in Louisiana “there must exist evidence, from which the 
jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was torture or the pitiless infliction of 
unnecessary pain on the victim”). This kind of language may constrain the scope of the 
prosecutor’s presentation, but it neither requires nor invites dispassion. 
55. See Berman & Bibas, supra note 13, at 359 (noting quintessential jury questions in 
capital punishment cases are laden with emotion). 
56. 501 U.S. at 826 (emphasis added). For a fuller discussion of the role of emotion in 
victim-impact testimony, see generally Bandes, Empathy, supra note 13. 
57. See Douglas N. Walton, Appeal to Pity: Argumentum ad Misericordiam 174 (1997) 
(“Because the state of the defendant’s mind is a relevant issue in this type of defense, 
appeals to sympathy or compassion cannot be excluded from a criminal trial as irrelevant, 
generally.”). 
58. See id. at 175–76 (discussing pity-based argument in imperfect self-defense 
context). 
59. See Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident 
on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 11, 14–15 (1986) (“The defense is 
designed to persuade the fact-finder that the defendant’s status as a battered woman 
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killings are permitted to pursue similar strategies, to invite the jury to 
experience the emotional disturbance that allegedly precipitated the 
offense.60 
The victim-impact example makes clear, however, that pathetic 
argument in criminal law need not always be in the service of mitigation. 
Sentencing hearings may involve statements by prosecutors crafted to 
arouse contempt toward the accused or by the judge herself seeking to 
instill shame or remorse in the defendant. Dan Kahan has argued that 
criminal punishment itself often is and should be graduated not simply 
based on the harm caused by the defendant’s acts or on the defendant’s 
personal moral culpability but also, to paraphrase H.L.A. Hart, “‘as a means 
of venting or emphatically expressing moral condemnation.’”61 Kahan 
advocates shaming penalties as superior to alternative sanctions such as 
fines and community service because shaming better captures the 
expressive dimension of criminal punishment.62 Shaming penalties 
typically involve gratuitous public exposure for crimes, such as solicitation 
of a prostitute or sexual abuse of a child, that defy the community’s 
conventional morality.63 It is impossible to argue in favor of a shaming 
penalty or to impose one as a judge without recognizing and trading on the 
fact that certain crimes arouse enmity or disgust among the public and, 
when publicized, tend to deeply embarrass the perpetrator. 
Pathetic argument does not receive unqualified acceptance even in 
the contexts just discussed. The three-Justice plurality that announced the 
opinion of the Court in Gardner v. Florida wrote, “It is of vital importance to 
the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death 
sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or 
emotion.”64 That statement routinely appears in death penalty opinions.65 
Jurors in capital cases are frequently instructed that they are not to decide 
                                                                                                                 
renders reasonable her belief that self-help was justified [and she] should be acquitted . . . 
.”); see also, e.g., State v. Norris, 279 S.E.2d 570, 573–74 (N.C. 1981) (permitting imperfect 
self-defense theory to reduce first degree murder to voluntary manslaughter in case 
involving battered woman defendant). 
60. See Caroline Forell, Homicide and the Unreasonable Man, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
597, 601 (2004) (reviewing Cynthia Lee, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and Fear 
in the Criminal Courtroom (2003)) (“Through the defenses of provocation and self-defense 
the law continues to empathize with violent men [by] defining reasonableness to mean 
typicality and then permitting juries to find atypical conduct derived from typical emotions 
sufficient as an excuse or justification.”). 
61. Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 25, at 596 (quoting H.L.A. Hart, Law, 
Liberty & Morality 65–66 (1963)). 
62. See id. at 635–37 (explaining advantages of shaming punishments). 
63. See id. at 631–34 (discussing four classes of shaming penalties—stigmatizing 
publicity, literal stigmatization, self-debasement, and contrition). 
64. 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). 
65. E.g., Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 363 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 189 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 
U.S. 110, 126 (1991). 
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punishment based on sympathy,66 and the Court has rejected claims that 
such an instruction prevents the jury from considering mitigating 
evidence.67 Courts have recognized a difference between mercy (OK) and 
sympathy (not OK),68 just as they have recognized a distinction between 
retribution (OK) and vengeance (not OK).69  
Still, to the degree that these are formally different concepts, the 
ineluctable moral content of the criminal law means that, if the distinction 
is intended to track the use or nonuse of pathetic argument, it is a fiction in 
practice. A majority of the en banc Tenth Circuit addressed this tension in 
Parks v. Brown, one of the cases in which the Supreme Court eventually 
rejected a constitutional challenge to an antisympathy jury instruction70: 
“Mercy,” “humane” treatment, “compassion,” and 
consideration of the unique “humanity” of the defendant, which 
have all been affirmed as relevant considerations in the penalty 
phase of a capital case, all inevitably involve sympathy or are 
sufficiently intertwined with sympathy that they cannot be parsed 
without significant risk of confusion in the mind of a reasonable 
juror.71 
Even if these considerations are all conceptually different, jurors 
cannot be expected to cleanse their minds of all emotion in applying them 
to evidence. Likewise, advocates cannot be expected, and are not expected, 
                                                 
66. See Kathryn Abrams, Emotions in the Mobilization of Rights, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
Rev. 551, 569 (2011) [hereinafter Abrams, Emotions] (“A source of particular controversy 
[is] the ‘anti-sympathy’ instruction frequently offered in capital cases, which informs the 
jury that it ‘must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, 
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.’” (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 
(1987))). 
67. See Brown, 479 U.S. at 543 (“[A] rational juror could hardly hear this instruction 
without concluding that it was meant to confine the jury’s deliberations to considerations 
arising from the evidence presented, both aggravating and mitigating.”); see also Saffle v. 
Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 492–93 (1990) (rejecting defendant’s contention that anti-sympathy 
instructions may cause jurors who react sympathetically to mitigating evidence to disregard 
that evidence entirely). 
68. Compare Saffle, 494 U.S. at 493 (“Whether a juror feels sympathy for a capital 
defendant is more likely to depend on that juror’s own emotions than on the actual evidence 
regarding the crime and the defendant.”), with Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327 (1989) 
(“[S]o long as the class of murderers subject to capital punishment is narrowed, there is no 
constitutional infirmity in a procedure that allows a jury to recommend mercy based on the 
mitigating evidence introduced by a defendant.”), overruled on other grounds by Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
69. See Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) 
(“In saying that ‘retribution’ can serve as a legitimate basis for imposing the death penalty, 
the Supreme Court has recognized an important distinction between the two concepts that 
the term might be held to embrace: the expression of moral outrage by a community; and 
the exaction of blood vengeance.”). 
70. The jury instruction read, in relevant part: “You must avoid any influence of 
sympathy, sentiment, passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor when imposing sentence.” 
Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545, 1552 (10th Cir. 1988), rev’d sub nom. Saffle, 494 U.S. 484. 
71. Id. at 1555–56 (emphasis added). 
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to neglect the emotional dimensions of mercy and retribution in criminal 
sentencing. 
Pathetic argument may have greater purchase in criminal practice 
than in other areas of legal advocacy, but if so, this is a difference in degree 
only. Appeal to the emotions of the audience, whether judge or jury, has 
been considered a legitimate, even essential aspect of legal advocacy at 
least since the rise of the legal realists.72 Arthur Bachrach wrote in 1932 
that “brief writing is essentially a creative function in just as real a sense as 
writing dramas, novels, poems or short stories” and that the best 
advocates possess “a clear, emotional, as well as intellectual 
understanding” of the truth of their position.73  
Modern guides to trial advocacy are replete with admonitions that a 
good advocate must know her audience and must be willing to make 
emotional appeals.74 For example, the American Bar Association’s (ABA) 
litigation section in 2001 published The Winning Argument, written by 
“some of the country’s leading trial attorneys,” the foreword of which 
identifies its goal as “promot[ing] high standards of practice through 
mentoring those who are less experienced.”75 Chapter Two, “Winning 
Arguments Are Tailored to the Decision-Maker,” advises readers to 
consider the audience’s attitudes, beliefs, and values, to “[a]ssociate [their] 
case with [their] listener’s values,” and “[f]rame issues in emotionally 
compelling terms.”76 Chapter Six, “Winning Arguments Appeal to 
Emotion,” encourages advocates to “[r]ecognize that judges are subject to 
emotion” and offers advice on how to tell a compelling story, how to be 
“[s]ensitive to your listeners’ [f]eelings,” and how to develop “emotional 
intelligence.”77 Paul Mark Sandler’s Anatomy of a Trial, also an ABA 
publication, explicitly urges trial lawyers to rely on pathos in their opening 
statements: “Histrionics are never appropriate,” he writes, “but opening 
                                                 
72. See Helen A. Anderson, Changing Fashions in Advocacy: 100 Years of Brief-Writing 
Advice, 11 J. App. Prac. & Process 1, 10–12 (2010) (highlighting legal realist reaction against 
neutral judicial reasoning). Defenses of pathetic argument of course predate the realists. In 
Ancient Greece, handbooks on rhetoric advised legal advocates (who were then laypersons) 
to use their closing arguments (epilogoi) to “seek to arouse the emotions of the jury.” 
Kennedy, Introduction, supra note 29, at 9. Indeed, as Michael Frost writes, “What 
distinguishes the Greek and Roman analyses of legal discourse from modern analyses is 
their consistent focus on audience, the depth and detail of their analysis, and their candid 
discussions of how to manipulate judges and juries.” Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal 
Audience, 99 Dick. L. Rev. 85, 87 (1994). 
73. Arthur C. Bachrach, Reflections on Brief Writing, 27 Ill. L. Rev. 374, 377–78 (1932).  
74. See Frost, supra note 72, at 85 (suggesting importance of understanding audience 
and appealing to emotion is often overlooked); see also Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot 
Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 Legal Writing 127, 135 (2008) (“[A]n appellate 
brief writer who overlooks the emotional appeal of her case does so at her client’s great 
peril.”). 
75. Robert A. Clifford, Foreword to Ronald Waicukauski, Paul Mark Sandler & JoAnne 
Epps, The Winning Argument, at iii (2001). 
76. Waicukauski, Sandler & Epps, supra note 75, at 32. 
77. Id. at 86–89.  
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statements should make some emotional pull on the audience, however 
subtle.”78 Advocates can appeal to emotion, for example, through 
modulation of their tone and volume, judicious use of storytelling, making 
eye contact, and body language more generally.79 These suggestions are, of 
course, of a piece with approaches to persuasion outside of legal contexts. 
In introducing his treatise on argumentum ad misericordiam (“appeal to 
pity”), the rhetorician Douglas Walton writes that people accept appeals to 
pity in all kinds of cases—in trials, immigration hearings, parole cases, 
charitable appeals for aid, public relations campaigns on behalf of causes 
like animal rights, and all sorts of other causes.80 
There is indeed reason to believe such appeals should be more 
prevalent in certain legal contexts than in lay contexts. In an adversarial 
system, the attorney owes an ethical obligation of zealous representation 
to his client. Norms of representation in the United States extend that duty 
to ends that plainly transcend customary moral boundaries.81 Thus, 
Monroe Freedman concludes that a criminal defense attorney has a duty to 
seek to undermine the credibility of a witness he knows to be truthful;82 
that he is required to put the defendant on the stand even if he knows she 
will commit perjury;83 and that he must offer truthful legal advice even if 
he knows that the client will use the information obtained to commit 
perjury or other crimes.84 Professional responsibility rules address each of 
these situations, and they are much debated within the profession, but to 
the degree governing ethics rules diverge from Freedman’s conclusions, 
they go no farther than to permit (rather than require) an attorney to 
mitigate the zealotry of his representation.85 It is this normative posture of 
                                                 
78. Paul Mark Sandler, Anatomy of a Trial: A Handbook for Young Lawyers 33 (2011). 
79. See id. at 34. 
80. Walton, supra note 57, at xiii. 
81. See David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study xx, 52 (1988) (describing 
distinction between “role morality” and “common morality” and resultant lack of 
accountability to moral obligations created by adversary system); Gerald J. Postema, Moral 
Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 63, 63–66 (1980) (providing 
commentary on distinction between “professional responsibility” and “ordinary morality”); 
see also Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to 
Clients Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 81, 129 (1994) (finding only around 
half of surveyed New Jersey lawyers disclosed client intentions to commit unlawful acts 
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm in situations in which state professional 
responsibility rules mandated disclosure). 
82. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: 
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1469, 1475 (1966).  
83. Id. at 1477–78. 
84. Id. at 1479–80. 
85. For instance see, respectively, Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.1 (2010) (“A 
lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that 
could result in incarceration, may . . . so defend the proceeding as to require that every 
element of the case be established.”); id. R. 3.3(a)(3) (“A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, 
other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably 
believes is false.”); id. R. 1.2(d) (“[A] lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any 
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barely qualified respect for the client’s ends that leads Daniel Markovits to 
conclude that lawyers “unfairly prefer their clients over others and, 
moreover, serve their clients in ways that implicate common vices with 
familiar names: most notably, lawyers lie and cheat.”86 One need not adopt 
Markovits’s position in full to concede that, at a minimum, an American 
lawyer’s professional duties at least permit and may require him to offer a 
pathetic argument whenever he believes such an argument is more likely 
than not to advance his client’s interests. 
Most of the situations described above pertain most directly to 
lawyers trying to win cases or otherwise secure favorable outcomes before 
judges and juries. As discussed, a willingness to advance pathetic 
arguments may well fit within the role morality of a legal advocate, 
particularly a trial advocate, in an adversarial system. It is more 
controversial, though hardly unheard of,87 to assume a similar duty in the 
appellate context, in which the audience comprises judges and in which 
the subject of discussion tends to focus on questions of law rather than 
fact.88 It is far more controversial to say that judges should themselves use 
emotional appeals in the course of writing opinions. It is more 
controversial still to assert that there may a legitimate place for emotional 
appeals within the opinion of a judge deciding a constitutional interpretive 
question (as opposed, say, to conducting a sentencing hearing). The next 
section substantiates those claims. Note, however, that the argument to 
this point already complicates the view that pathos has no place at all in 
legal argument, including in constitutional argument. The principal 
rationale for appealing to emotion before a judge in a criminal case or in 
an ordinary civil action—namely, that such an appeal may succeed—
applies equally to appellate argument and to constitutional adjudication, 
even if the likely payoff of such an argument is smaller. And so the case 
against pathetic argument in constitutional cases, if it is to persuade, must 
derive from the particular role morality of constitutional judges. 
C. Pathos in Constitutional Judging 
Overt appeal to emotion is as scandalous in judging as it is prevalent 
in trial advocacy treatises. The tone of the opposition to emotion is evident 
in the discourse surrounding the 2009 Supreme Court nomination of Sonia 
Sotomayor, which revolved around the related but distinct issue of the role 
of “empathy” and “compassion” in judicial decisionmaking. After Justice 
                                                                                                                 
proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good 
faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.”). 
86. Daniel Markovits, A Modern Legal Ethics 25 (2008). 
87. See Chestek, supra note 74, at 130 (describing value of empathy in appellate 
advocacy generally); Frost, supra note 72, at 85 (noting existence of only limited scholarship 
on role of emotion in appellate discourse). 
88. Cf. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading 
Judges 31–32 (2008) (arguing appeal to emotion is “jury argument” that should not figure 
into advocacy before judges). 
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Souter retired, President Obama said, “I view that quality of empathy, of 
understanding and identifying with people’s hopes and struggles, as an 
essential ingredient for arriving at just decisions and outcomes.”89 In his 
statement nominating then-Judge Sotomayor to the Court, Obama said that 
personal experiences “can give a person a common touch and a sense of 
compassion; an understanding of how the world works and how ordinary 
people live. And that is why it is a necessary ingredient in the kind of 
justice we need on the Supreme Court.”90 
President Obama’s remarks do not directly address the role of 
pathetic argument in judging. Whether a judge is motivated by emotion in 
reaching decisions is distinct from whether she seeks to appeal to emotion 
in announcing them. But the reaction to the President’s remarks, viewed in 
combination with the reaction to other controversial statements made by 
Judge Sotomayor, help to diagnose the perceived problem with pathos 
playing any role in the judicial process.  
Judge Sotomayor made at least three comments that combined with 
President Obama’s empathy discussion to create a meme of judicial 
lawlessness that grounded criticism of the nomination. Most famously, at a 
speech in 2001, Sotomayor said, “I would hope that a wise Latina woman 
with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a 
better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.”91 In the 
same speech, she said, “I willingly accept that we who judge must not deny 
the differences resulting from experience and heritage, but attempt . . . 
continuously to judge when those opinions, sympathies and prejudices are 
appropriate.”92 Four years later, at a panel discussion in 2005, Judge 
Sotomayor said that a “court of appeals is where policy is made. And I 
know—I know this is on tape, and I should never say that because we 
don’t make law. I know. O.K. I know. I’m not promoting it. I’m not 
advocating it.”93 
All of these remarks—President Obama’s invocations of empathy and 
compassion, Judge Sotomayor’s suggestion that her status as a Latina was 
relevant to her decisionmaking, and her belief that appellate judges make 
policy—played important and interrelated roles in the nomination hearing 
and its surrounding discourse. Republican Senator Jeff Sessions, then the 
ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, singled out each of 
those remarks in his opening statement at the hearing. It is worth quoting 
                                                 
89. Peter Baker, In Search for New Justice, Empathy, or at Least ‘Empathy,’ Is Out, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 26, 2010, at A12. 
90. Barack Obama, Remarks by President in Nominating Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the 
United States Supreme Court (May 26, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-nominating-judge-sonia-sotomayor-united-states-supreme-
court (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
91. Charlie Savage, A Judge’s View of Judging Is on the Record, N.Y. Times, May 15, 
2009, at A21. 
92. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Trailblazer and a Dreamer, N.Y. Times, May 27, 2009, at A1. 
93. Savage, supra note 91. 
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his statement at some length, as it efficiently encapsulates a basic 
criticism: 
[O]ur legal system is based on a firm belief in an ordered 
universe and objective truth. The trial is the process by which the 
impartial and wise judge guides us to the truth.  
Down the other path lies a Brave New World where words 
have no true meaning and judges are free to decide what facts 
they choose to see. In this world, a judge is free to push his or her 
own political or social agenda. . . . 
. . . . 
I am afraid our system will only be further corrupted . . . as a 
result of President Obama’s views that, in tough cases, the critical 
ingredient for a judge is the “depth and breadth of one’s 
empathy,” as well as . . . “their broader vision of what America 
should be.”  
Like the American people, I have watched this process for a 
number of years, and I fear that this “empathy standard” is 
another step down the road to a liberal activist, results-oriented, 
and relativistic world where laws lose their fixed meaning, 
unelected judges set policy, [and] Americans are seen as 
members of separate groups rather than as simply Americans . . . . 
So we have reached a fork in the road . . . and there are stark 
differences.  
I want to be clear:  
I will not vote for—and no [S]enator should vote for—an 
individual nominated by any President who is not fully 
committed to fairness and impartiality toward every person who 
appears before them.  
I will not vote for—and no Senator should vote for—an 
individual nominated by any President who believes it is 
acceptable for a judge to allow their personal background, 
gender, prejudices, or sympathies to sway their decision in favor 
of, or against, parties before the court. In my view, such a 
philosophy is disqualifying.  
Such an approach to judging means that the umpire calling 
the game is not neutral, but instead feels empowered to favor one 
team over the other.  
Call it empathy, call it prejudice, or call it sympathy, but 
whatever it is, it is not law. In truth, it is more akin to politics, and 
politics has no place in the courtroom.94 
For Senator Sessions, empathy is a code word for sympathy, which is 
a code word for prejudice. The prevalence of these qualities in judges calls 
to Sessions’s mind a legal dystopia characterized by moral relativism, 
                                                 
94. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6–7 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Member, S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary). 
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subjectivity, discretion, activism, opportunism, cultural pluralism, and 
partiality; in a word, bias. 
The fear runs even deeper than this. It is not merely that emotional 
influence risks improper favoritism for one party over another, or risks 
injecting politics into legal decisionmaking. It is that denying emotion a 
place within the rule of law counters a cognitive bias in favor of the visible 
over the invisible, and short over long-term consequences. John Hasnas 
makes the point thus: 
The law consists of abstract rules because we know that, as 
human beings, judges are unable to foresee all of the long-term 
consequences of their decisions and may be unduly influenced by 
the immediate, visible effects of these decisions. The rules of law 
are designed in part to strike the proper balance between the 
interests of those who are seen and those who are not seen. The 
purpose of the rules is to enable judges to resist the emotionally 
engaging temptation to relieve the plight of those they can see 
and empathize with, even when doing so would be unfair to those 
they cannot see.  
Calling on judges to be compassionate or empathetic is in 
effect to ask them to undo this balance and favor the seen over 
the unseen . . . . [I]f the difference between the bad judge and the 
good judge is that the bad judge focuses on the visible effects of 
his or her decisions while the good judge takes into account both 
the effects that can be seen and those that are unseen, then the 
compassionate, empathetic judge is very likely to be a bad 
judge.95 
The problem Hasnas identifies is not just an ethical problem but 
implicates the judge’s technical competence as well. The empathetic judge 
faces serious cognitive limitations even when empathy is viewed in its best 
possible light. 
The point is important because, better than the concern with bias that 
Sessions focuses on, it responds to a standard move by Sotomayor’s 
defenders: the claim that her critics elided the distinction between 
empathy and sympathy.96 Empathy is best understood as a cognitive 
capacity rather than as an emotion as such.97 It is “the ability to 
                                                 
95. John Hasnas, Op-Ed, The Unseen Deserve Empathy Too, Wall St. J., May 29, 2009, at 
A15. 
96. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 89 (“Empathy means being able to imagine oneself in 
the condition or predicament of another, while sympathy means sharing the feelings of 
another to the point of compassion or pity.” (paraphrasing remarks by Pamela Karlan)). 
97. See Maroney, supra note 4, at 637 (“Empathy can be defined not as an emotion but 
rather a capacity to imagine the world from the perspective of another.”); Susan A. Bandes, 
Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law, 2009 Cardozo L. Rev. de•novo 133, 136 (describing 
empathy as ability to take “‘imaginative leap into the mind of others’”) (quoting Candace 
Clark, Misery and Company: Sympathy in Everyday Life 34 (1997)). 
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understand and share the feelings of another”98 as distinguished from 
“feelings of pity and sorrow for someone else’s misfortune.”99 Defenders of 
an empathy standard wanted to emphasize that they rejected formalism, 
not neutrality, and that a judge should appreciate to the fullest extent 
possible the law’s effects on real people. Hasnas’s response defends 
formalism as a prophylactic safeguard of neutrality, promulgating the idea 
that we cannot help but to empathize selectively. Moreover, empathy 
invites sympathy even if it does not compel it. Adam Smith wrote that 
when we imagine ourselves in the position of another person, “[P]assion 
arises in our breast from the imagination.”100 What is the use of a capacity 
to understand another’s feelings if a judge then refuses to permit those 
feelings to influence her behavior? Should judges aspire to empathize 
“better” or not at all? 
The basis for Bobbitt’s criticism of pathetic argument as reflecting 
“the idiosyncratic, personal traits”101 is now clearer. If the trial advocacy 
guides are to be believed, appeal to pathos is most likely to succeed where 
the advocate is able to use emotion to form a bond with his audience. The 
Winning Argument recounts the strategy of the great English advocate 
James Scarlett: “It was said that the secret of his success was that he 
blended his mind with the minds of the jurors. Their thoughts were his 
thoughts.”102 It is for this reason that the book advises advocates to 
“[a]ssociate [their] case with [the] listener’s values”103 and to “share the 
emotional response [they] seek” in the audience.104 Anatomy of a Trial 
advises that lawyers should “avoid emotional appeals unless you can feel 
the emotion yourself.”105 
The critical response to the Sotomayor nomination suggests, however, 
that emotion is undisciplined and leads to prejudice and subjectivity. That 
judges should not only abide but should also assimilate themselves to the 
passions of the people seems precisely backwards. Hasnas’s allusion to the 
relationship between emotion and time calls to mind Alexander Bickel’s 
proposition that “government under law” means that “government should 
serve not only what we conceive from time to time to be our immediate 
                                                 
98. Concise Oxford American Dictionary 294 (Erin McKean et al. eds., 2006) (defining 
“empathy”). 
99. Id. at 921 (defining “sympathy”). 
100. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments ch. 1, § 1, para. 10 (Knud 
Haakonssen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1759). 
101. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 95. 
102. Waicukauski, Sandler & Epps, supra note 75, § 2.01, at 12. 
103. Id. § 3.03, at 32. 
104. Id. § 6.03, at 88. 
105. Sandler, supra note 78, at 34; cf. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer 16 (1993) 
(describing ideal lawyer-statesman as possessing “qualities as much of feeling as of 
thought”). 
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material needs but also certain enduring values,”106 and that “judges have, 
or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the 
ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government.”107 Bickel sought 
to justify the countermajoritarian nature of judicial review; on this view, 
disciplined thinkers have far less need to be checked by judges. The 
received wisdom is that “emotion has a certain narrowly defined place in 
law,” Bandes writes.108 “It is assigned to the criminal courts. It is confined 
to those—like witnesses, the accused, the public—without legal 
training.”109 A good judge enforces distance between law and the 
incautious emotionalism of the public: “[I]t is portrayed as crucially 
important to narrowly delineate that finite list and those proper roles, so 
that emotion doesn’t encroach on the true preserve of law: which is 
reason.”110 
 This Article began with a discussion of Justice Blackmun and the 
tension between his opinions in Roe and DeShaney. Justice Blackmun’s 
retirement was attended by the usual fond remembrances that follow an 
important figure’s withdrawal from public life.111 Writing in the New 
Republic, however, Jeffrey Rosen decided to say what many believed.112 
After describing Justice Blackmun’s kind and generous personal 
disposition, Rosen wrote: 
But feeling deeply is no substitute for arguing rigorously; and the 
qualities that made Blackmun an admirable man ultimately 
condemned him to be an ineffective justice. By reducing so many 
cases to their human dimensions and refusing to justify his 
impulses with principled legal arguments, Blackmun showed the 
dangers of the jurisprudence of sentiment.113 
Rosen singled out two objectionable features of Justice Blackmun’s 
jurisprudence: “particularism—focusing on the human consequences of 
                                                 
106. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 24 (Yale Univ. Press 1986) 
(1962). 
107. Id. at 25–26. 
108. Bandes, Introduction, supra note 46, at 2. 
109. Id. 
110. Id.; see Maroney, supra note 4, at 631 (“[T]o call a judge emotional is a stinging 
insult, signifying a failure of discipline, impartiality, and reason.”); cf. Scalia & Garner, supra 
note 88, at 32 (“Good judges pride themselves on the rationality of their rulings and the 
suppression of their personal proclivities, including most especially their emotions. And bad 
judges want to be regarded as good judges. So either way, overt appeal to emotion is likely 
to be regarded as an insult.”). 
111. E.g., Ann Alpers, Tribute: Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1994); 
Harold Hongju Koh, A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1994). 
112. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1421, 1434 (1995) (calling several of Justice Blackmun’s more sentimental 
opinions, including DeShaney, “embarrassing performances precisely because they seem the 
unmediated expression of self”). Posner wrote the lower court opinion that DeShaney 
affirmed. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987). 
113. Jeffrey Rosen, Sentimental Journey: The Emotional Jurisprudence of Harry 
Blackmun, New Republic, May 2, 1994, at 13. 
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every decision” and “compassion—a more abstract commitment to 
dramatizing the plight of the poor and the downtrodden, without 
reference to actual individuals.”114 Rosen argued that Blackmun’s 
sentimentality took both forms at different times and simultaneously 
reflects a lack of sophistication and a basic lawlessness.115 
Rosen echoes common themes that help constitute Maroney’s 
“cultural script of judicial dispassion.” But his conclusion that Blackmun’s 
sentimentality reduced his effectiveness might be too quick. There is 
remarkable consensus among supporters and opponents of abortion rights 
that Roe is an unsuccessful opinion.116 Many conservatives fault the 
opinion for failing to treat with due gravity the state’s emotionally 
invested interest in the potential life of the fetus.117 It is considered 
unsuccessful by many liberals in part because it is, in Michael Dorf’s words, 
“emotionally empty,”118 deaf to the personal crisis of conscience that faces 
women (not doctors) burdened by an unwanted pregnancy. By contrast, 
“Poor Joshua!,” a dissent, continues to be invoked in popular media,119 in 
books and scholarly articles,120 and in classrooms,121 and remains the 
public face of the DeShaney decision. Herbert Eastman, a legal services 
lawyer and clinician writing in the Yale Law Journal in 1995, cited Justice 
Blackmun’s dissent as the kind of opinion that helps to sustain public 
interest litigators who face significant doctrinal obstacles: 
[A]s Clarence Darrow often observed, in these agonizing cases 
where courts can hide behind law, there is always one judge or 
juror who will not. There may be more than one who will listen 
                                                 
114. Id. at 14. 
115. See id. 
116. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade: An Engine of Controversy, in What Roe 
v. Wade Should Have Said 3 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (discussing how Roe remains source of 
political and legal controversy). 
117. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 
78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 995, 996–97 (2003) (“[T]he regime created in Roe . . . creates an 
essentially unrestricted substantive legal right of some human beings to kill—murder, 
really, since the power is plenary and requires no serious justification for its exercise—other 
human beings, at a rate of approximately a million and a half a year.”) (footnotes omitted). 
118. Michael C. Dorf, In Praise of Justice Blackmun: (Corrected) Typos and All, 99 
Colum. L. Rev. 1397, 1399 (1999). 
119. E.g., Bob Egelko, Head Against Heart in Pot Case: Supreme Court Reviews Local 
Law, S.F. Chron. (Jan. 9. 2005, 4:00 am), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Head-
against-heart-in-pot-case-Supreme-Court-2739879.php#photo-2184644 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review); Charles Lane, Court Tackles Town’s Role in Child Safety, Wash. Post, 
Mar. 21, 2005, at A2. 
120. E.g., Lynne Curry, The DeShaney Case: Child Abuse, Family Rights, and the 
Dilemma of State Intervention 127, 130 (2007); Sharon Balmer, From Poverty to Abuse and 
Back Again: The Failure of the Legal and Social Services Communities to Protect Foster 
Children, 32 Fordham Urb. L.J. 935, 946 (2005). 
121. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Remembering a Justice Who Cared, Trial, May 1999, at 
92, 92 (noting he reads Justice Blackmun’s DeShaney dissent aloud whenever he teaches 
case). 
2013] PATHETIC ARGUMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW  1025 
  
to . . . the social context of the problems facing our clients, the 
identity of our clients and their stories, the wall of “us/them” 
separating our clients from the court and from us, and our own 
voices—our own response to the tragedies we witness.122 
If Justice Blackmun’s appeal in DeShaney was wrong, as many of the 
arguments in this Part suggest, it was not for lack of effectiveness. 
 II. THE PLACE OF PATHOS 
 In their treatise on persuading judges, Antonin Scalia and Bryan 
Garner explain that they “strongly” reject the notion that advocates should 
make emotional appeals to judges, but that it is “essential” to appeal to a 
judge’s “sense of justice.”123 This Article’s principal subject diverges from 
theirs, but we may likewise wish to distinguish judicial appeals to the 
reader’s emotion from an appeal to her sense of justice, the latter of which 
we may presume to be uncontroversial. This Part seeks to define 
emotional appeals and to reconcile their use in constitutional opinions 
with prevailing descriptive accounts of constitutional argument. It 
concludes that pathetic argument is both identifiable and significant in 
United States constitutional law, but that such argument, like ethical 
argument, is better described as a mode of persuasion than as an 
archetype of constitutional argument. 
 A. Pathos Defined 
It is common ground among scholars of the affective sciences that the 
border between emotions and other cognitive processes is and always will 
be disputed.124 Efforts to outline the basic contours of the category we 
associate with the label of “emotions” tend to begin with our own 
experiences and intuitions.125 In determining what does and does not 
qualify as an emotion or an emotional response, scholars begin by 
identifying the core conceptions of the category, try to describe the 
characteristics of those ideal conceptions, and then seek to extrapolate.126 
Research into facial expressions suggests that across a broad range of 
Western and non-Western cultures people associate particular 
                                                 
122. Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights 
Litigators, 104 Yale L.J. 763, 854–55 (1995). 
123. Scalia & Garner, supra note 88, at 31–32. 
124. See Bandes, Introduction, supra note 46, at 10. The scholarship on emotion is vast 
and unwieldy, ranging across fields as diverse as psychology, philosophy, economics, 
neurology, anthropology, and biology. The impossibility of confining emotion scholarship to 
one field itself reflects the difficulty in arriving at a shared definition of emotion. See 
generally Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are (1997) (arguing emotion describes 
phenomena too diverse to be captured by one term). 
125. See Nussbaum, Upheavals, supra note 11, at 9. 
126. See id. 
1026 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 113:#### 
  
expressions with happiness, anger, fear, sadness, disgust, and surprise.127 
Any theoretical account that seeks to define emotions must account for 
and resonate with our experience of these standard emotions, but it is 
difficult to say much else without courting significant controversy. 
Aristotle described emotions broadly as “those things through which, 
by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgments.”128 This 
definition is not helpful in distinguishing emotions from other dynamic 
mental processes that influence individual decision making, but it is not 
yet clear that it needs to articulate that distinction. Arriving at a working 
definition of emotion is only instrumental, for our purposes, to 
understanding what is meant by an appeal to emotion in the context of a 
judicial decision. And so a definition of emotion is only useful to the degree 
that it helps us answer this second question. Thus, it is common ground 
that anger is an emotion, but in evaluating a judge’s appeal to the reader’s 
anger, it should matter, it seems, what the object of that anger is. Anger at 
the frailty of the majority’s logic is, plausibly, an emotion any dissenter 
should wish to stir. Upon reflection one may conclude that criticism of 
pathetic argument is directed not at the manipulation of “emotion” as such 
but rather at the context in which such argument occurs: the valence or 
character of the particular emotions evoked, the objects at which they are 
directed, and the rationales offered or implied in invoking them. If this is 
so, Aristotle’s definition may well suffice. 
It is doubtful, though, that critics of pathetic argument would accept 
this deconstructive move. Garner and Scalia have something in mind when 
they suggest that an appeal to one’s sense of justice is importantly 
different from an appeal to emotion, and so it is worth spending some time 
with the literature to see whether we can uncover what that something is. 
The sprawling literature seeking to develop a taxonomy of emotion and to 
understand its basic ontology is not easily summarized, and I will not 
attempt to do so here.129 It is both fruitful and manageable, however, to 
contrast two different, broad understandings of emotion: the “feeling 
theory” and the cognitive view. Doing so will help to clarify why a 
definition of emotion adequate to construct a true dichotomy between 
emotional appeals and appeals to one’s sense of justice is unlikely to 
emerge from the literature. 
                                                 
127. Paul Ekman & Dacher Keltner, Universal Facial Expressions of Emotion: An Old 
Controversy and New Findings, in Nonverbal Communication: Where Nature Meets Culture 
27, 31–33 (Ullica Sergestråle & Peter Molnár eds., 1997). 
128. Aristotle, supra note 1, bk. 2, ch. 1, § 8.  
129. For a learned and helpful effort, see generally Ronald de Sousa, Emotion, Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2012), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/emotion/ (on file with the Columbia 
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The first understanding of emotion we will consider is the so-called 
“feeling theory,” commonly associated with the work of William James.130 
Taking as his subject those emotions often linked with some physiological 
bodily response, James challenged the notion that what he called the 
“standard” emotions arise out of some independent mental process and 
subsequently produce the associated physical response. Rather it is the 
reverse: We apply a label to the feeling associated with a particular 
physical sensation: 
Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we 
meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, 
are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says 
that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state 
is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily 
manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the 
more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, 
angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that 
we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, 
as the case may be. Without the bodily states following on the 
perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, 
colourless, destitute of emotional warmth.131 
James believed that emotions such as “[s]urprise, curiosity, rapture, 
fear, anger, lust, [and] greed” are conventional labels that we apply to 
mental states produced by “bodily disturbances”132—the furrowing of the 
brow associated with worry, the lump in the throat tied to shame, the 
perspiration of fear, and so forth.133 James arrived at this view through a 
kind of thought experiment in which he sought to imagine the mental 
states that carry the labels of various emotions without any attendant 
physical manifestations and found that he could not. Experiencing some 
phenomenon as “funny” is inseparable from the physical response of 
laughter.134 Likewise, one cannot extract any abstract concept of rage 
away from its physical manifestations, from “flushing of the face,” “dilation 
of the nostrils,” and “clenching of the teeth.”135 According to James, “[a] 
purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity.”136 
If emotions have no substance independent of their associated 
physical feelings, then how do we know that the feeling precedes the 
                                                 
130. See William James, What Is an Emotion?, 9 Mind 188, 188–205 (1884) (arguing 
emotional brain-processes are sensorial brain-processes variably combined); see also Carl 
Georg Lange & William James, The Emotions (1922) (collecting essays by James and Lange 
explicating their view). A variation on the feeling theory is also associated with David Hume, 
see David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (John P. Wright et al. eds., Everyman 
Paperbacks 2003) (1739). 
131. James, supra note 130, at 190. 
132. See id. at 189. 
133. See id. at 192–93. 
134. See id. at 193. 
135. Id. at 194. 
136. Id. 
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emotion rather than vice versa? James answers this with another 
anecdotal observation, namely that experiencing the bodily changes 
associated with emotions tends to make our perception of them more 
acute, as when crying intensifies our pain or moping amplifies our 
sadness.137 James further discusses the experiences of people 
experiencing depression or paranoia, who may easily dissociate their 
perceived feeling from their cognitive response to some stimulus but who 
nonetheless find themselves in the grip of overwhelming physical 
sensations or disturbances.138 
On the feeling theory of emotion just described, an intentional appeal 
to emotion can only be understood as an attempt to excite one of the 
physical states that we associate with emotions. But describing such an 
effort as ipso facto objectionable in the context of appeals to or by judges 
runs headlong into the most trenchant objection to the feeling theory 
within the philosophical literature: that emotions tend to have intentional 
objects and to presuppose cognitive propositions about those objects.139 
On this view, fear of death and fear of spiders are different emotions; the 
content of the emotion cannot be explained or understood unless we know 
something about death and about spiders (and likely about the individual’s 
personal history). Describing someone as euphoric without associating 
that euphoria with some object of evaluation—a new job, a new lover, a 
successful exam performance, and so on—may describe a mood or an 
appetite but not an emotion. At a minimum, some emotions (love, say) 
have propositional objects that are integral to the emotion’s genetic 
structure, and so it will not do to condemn “emotion” as necessarily 
severable, for example, from one’s sense of justice.140 
For simplicity, I will associate the cognitive view with Nussbaum, who 
explicates a version in great detail in her 2001 book Upheavals of 
Thought.141 On Nussbaum’s account, emotions cover a diverse set of 
phenomena but they are distinct from the rote physical manifestations 
James linked to them in four ways. First, as discussed, they are “about 
something: they have an object,”142 and the emotion’s identity depends on 
its object. Feelings of envy or hope, for example, are unintelligible apart 
                                                 
137. See id. at 197–98. 
138. See id. at 199–200. 
139. See Demian Whiting, The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed 
Emotions, 19 Eur. J. Phil. 281, 282 (2009) (explaining objection to feeling theory based on 
intentional objects of emotions). 
140. Cf. Posner, Think, supra note 10, at 106 (“Indignation at a wrong is consistent 
with corrective justice; sympathy for a litigant is not.”). 
141. Nussbaum, Upheavals, supra note 11. This view has many variants. See generally, 
e.g., Jerome Neu, A Tear Is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion (2000); Robert C. 
Solomon, The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotions (1984); George Pitcher, 
Emotion, 74 Mind 326 (1965).  
142. Nussbaum, Upheavals, supra note 11, at 27 (emphasis omitted). 
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from their objects.143 Second, the object is “intentional” in that it is 
experienced subjectively by the person bearing the emotion,144 and that 
person’s subjectivity in view of the object is integral to distinguishing one 
emotion from another.145 Different individuals may form different 
emotions in relation to identical objects.146 Third, emotions are 
evaluative: They “embody not simply ways of seeing an object, but 
beliefs—often very complex—about the object.”147 Thus, for Nussbaum, 
“to have anger, I must have an even more complex set of beliefs: that some 
damage has occurred to me or to something or someone close to me; that 
the damage is not trivial but significant; that it was done by someone; 
probably, that it was done willingly.”148 One’s evaluation may be excessive 
or inappropriate in relation to prevailing social norms, or even false in 
relation to one’s other beliefs,149 but the evaluation itself is nonetheless 
critical to identifying the phenomenon as some particular emotion rather 
than as another that shares a physiological manifestation.150 Fourth, 
emotions involve a perception of value in their objects; the object is 
viewed as important to the person’s individual flourishing.151 This quality 
attaches even when that sense of value is inconsistent with one’s 
“reflective ethical beliefs.”152 
Nussbaum defends both the view that emotion is a kind of judgment 
and the counterintuitive view that there is nothing more to emotion than 
judgment.153 Many cognitivists resist the latter proposition.154 For 
example, Peter Goldie argues that our deeply subjective experience of 
                                                 
143. See id. at 35. 
144. Id. at 27. 
145. See id. at 27–28 (suggesting people attach different emotions to objects 
depending on their internal perceptions). 
146. Think, for example, how winners and losers form different emotions in response 
to the same sporting event. See Andrew Ortony, Gerald L. Clore & Allan Collins, The 
Cognitive Structure of Emotions 4 (1988) (“[I]n a very real sense, both the winners and the 
losers are reacting to the same objective event. It is their construals of the event that are 
different.”). 
147. Nussbaum, Upheavals, supra note 11, at 28. 
148. Id. at 28–29. 
149. See id. at 35–36 (describing how false beliefs can be retained in face of 
contradictory knowledge). 
150. See id. at 29–30 (arguing “[o]nly an inspection of the thoughts discriminates” 
between different emotions). 
151. See id. at 30–31. 
152. Id. at 52. 
153. See id. at 43–45 (arguing “not only that judgments of the sort we have described 
are necessary constituent elements in the emotion, but also that they are sufficient”). 
Nussbaum argues that emotion-based judgments result from vivid and intimate 
visualizations of their objects: “[T]he emotions typically have a connection to imagination, 
and to the concrete picturing of events in imagination.” Id. at 65. 
154. See, e.g., Richard Wollheim, On the Emotions 10 (1999) (“[I]magination can 
induce a particular emotional state in someone who does not have the emotional disposition 
that state would ordinarily manifest.”). 
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emotion involves a “feeling towards” the emotion’s object that cannot be 
rationally articulated as a belief, desire, or judgment, and that varies 
widely between individuals, but is nonetheless intelligible.155 The 
important point is that the dominant view among contemporary 
philosophers is that there is a kind of intelligence to emotions. They are 
not visceral and arbitrary, as is sometimes supposed; like thoughts and 
other cognitive instruments, they can be rational or irrational, based on 
accurate or inaccurate perceptions of one’s environment, consistent with 
one’s general constellation of beliefs, desires, and values or not.156 
It is not obvious what view of emotions those who criticize pathetic 
judicial argument have in mind, nor is it obvious whether they have any 
particular view in mind. There is reason to believe, however, that some 
version of the cognitive theory captures those critics’ working premise 
better than the feelings theory. If emotions are merely conventional labels 
for physical feelings, then it is enigmatic to say that an argument is 
“appealing” to emotion at all. We would as soon pop a balloon behind the 
listener’s head. But dominant varieties of the cognitive theory assume that 
emotions may be judged appropriate or inappropriate, may be learned or 
unlearned, and are, in a qualified way, predictable. The feelings theory 
does not necessarily deny these possibilities, but it is at least easier to 
agree that emotions are malleable in these ways if one also believes that 
emotions are partly constituted by particularized intentional objects and 
involve value judgments about those objects. 
In any event, in order to accept the simple view that judicial appeals 
to emotion are categorically inappropriate, one likely must adopt the 
corollary that emotions and rational judgment are never mutually 
dependent.157 On this view, it is never the case that a phenomenon fairly 
labeled an emotion is integral to individuals’ normative assessments of 
propositions of law. This view is radical158 and, as Part II.B shows, is likely 
not the view underlying the objection to pathetic argument in 
constitutional law. Moreover, as Part III.A seeks to demonstrate, holding 
the unusual position just described is necessary but not sufficient to make 
                                                 
155. Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration 19 (2002). 
156. See generally Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 11, at 275–301 (contrasting 
“mechanistic” and “evaluative” conceptions of emotion). 
157. Alternatively, one might adopt the related view that emotions and rational 
judgment are mutually dependent rarely enough that a prophylactic rule prohibiting 
pathetic arguments is sensible. 
158. Arguably, James did not himself hold this view. Recall that he limited his inquiry 
to emotions that have “a distinct bodily expression.” James, supra note 130, at 189. He 
conceded that there are “feelings of pleasure and displeasure, of interest and excitement, 
bound up with mental operations, but having no obvious bodily expression for their 
consequence,” but he concluded that in the absence of any such expression “such a judgment 
is rather to be classed among awarenesses of truth: it is a cognitive act.” Id. at 189, 202 
(emphasis omitted). It may be, then, that the difference between James and at least some 
cognitivists is semantic. 
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out a normative case against all instances of pathetic argument in 
constitutional law. 
 B. Pathos and Constitutional Argument 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,159 the 
Court upheld most of Pennsylvania’s abortion regulations but refused to 
overrule Roe v. Wade.160 Justice Scalia ended his partial concurrence with 
a description of the portrait of Roger Taney that hangs in the Caspersen 
Room of the Harvard Law School Library. “There is a poignant aspect to 
today’s opinion,” Justice Scalia wrote, referring to the length and tone of 
the joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, which sought 
to leverage the Court’s credibility to help settle the national controversy 
over abortion rights.161 He continued: 
There comes vividly to mind a portrait by Emanuel Leutze 
that hangs in the Harvard Law School: Roger Brooke Taney, 
painted in 1859, the 82d year of his life, the 24th of his Chief 
Justiceship, the second after his opinion in Dred Scott. He is all in 
black, sitting in a shadowed red armchair, left hand resting upon 
a pad of paper in his lap, right hand hanging limply, almost 
lifelessly, beside the inner arm of the chair. He sits facing the 
viewer, and staring straight out. There seems to be on his face, 
and in his deep set-eyes, an expression of profound sadness and 
disillusionment. Perhaps he always looked that way, even when 
dwelling upon the happiest of thoughts. But those of us who 
know how the lustre of his great Chief Justiceship came to be 
eclipsed by Dred Scott cannot help believing that he had that 
case—its already apparent consequences for the Court and its 
soon-to-be-played-out consequences for the Nation—burning on 
his mind. I expect that two years earlier he, too, had thought 
himself “call[ing] the contending sides of national controversy to 
end their national division by accepting a common mandate 
rooted in the Constitution.”162 
Justice Scalia’s opinion is an example of pathetic argument. It is not 
paradigmatically so, like “Poor Joshua!,” but its mode of persuasion is 
pathetic all the same.163 It advances a legal argument: affirming a 
constitutional right to abortion is akin to affirming a constitutional right to 
keep slaves in federal territories. But the argument is occluded beneath a 
thick layer of pathos. Justice Scalia, a skilled rhetorician, means to compare 
the visage of Roger Taney, a villain within the American constitutional 
narrative, with the joint opinion. He knows that showing rather than 
                                                 
159. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
160. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
161. Casey, 505 U.S. at 1001 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
162. Id. at 1001–02. 
163. Bandes writes: “Emotion tends to seem like part of the landscape when it’s 
familiar, and to become more visible when it’s unexpected.” Bandes, Introduction, supra 
note 46, at 11. 
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telling us that abortion is like slavery and that Roe is like Dred Scott 
enlivens the moral message and makes his opponent’s position feel not 
just wrong but shameful. 
Philip Bobbitt has identified six “modalities” of constitutional 
argument: historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical. 
Which modality does Justice Scalia’s opinion best reflect? It makes no 
reference to the Framers or to either the original or current meaning of 
any relevant constitutional language or provision. It does not draw 
inferences from constitutional structures or constitutionally embedded 
institutional relationships. It does refer to precedent—Dred Scott—but its 
treatment of that precedent is not doctrinal in the usual sense. Justice 
Scalia’s interest in Dred Scott is independent of the reasoning in Chief 
Justice Taney’s opinion. It is prudential in one sense—it cares deeply about 
the institutional consequences of continued Court involvement in abortion 
decisions. But it is the opposite of prudential in the sense that it proposes a 
“prudential” course on a priori moral rather than practical grounds. 
We are left with one option within Bobbitt’s taxonomy: ethical 
argument. Ethical argument captures the proposition that the preferred 
result “comports with the sort of people we are and the means we have 
chosen to solve political and customary constitutional problems.”164 
Ethical argument is a potentially capacious category whose contours have 
challenged scholars in the decades since Constitutional Fate was 
written.165 Bobbitt seeks to cabin the category by arguing that the relevant 
ethos that sustains ethical argument is the ethos of limited government.166 
It is, at the least, awkward to characterize Justice Scalia’s position in Casey 
as ethical in this sense, premised as it is on the state’s absolute freedom to 
require women to bear and beget children. Indeed, in expounding the 
category Bobbitt himself advances an ethical argument in favor of abortion 
rights.167 
One possibility is that Justice Scalia’s Casey opinion employed a 
seventh modality—pathetic argument—and that this modality was either 
overlooked by Bobbitt or is (as Bobbitt suggests)168 illegitimate. Bobbitt 
                                                 
164. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 94–95. 
165. See Patrick O. Gudridge, False Peace and Constitutional Tradition, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 
1969, 1975 (1983) (reviewing Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2) (describing 
Bobbitt’s definition of ethos as appearing “almost empty”). Compare Mark Tushnet, Red, 
White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law 111 (1988) (distinguishing two 
types of moral philosophy as “systematic moral philosophy” and “moral philosophy of 
community”), with Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1233, 1287–301 (1989) 
(reviewing Tushnet, supra) (vigorously disputing Tushnet’s identification of ethical 
argument with moral argument). 
166. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 15, at 20 (“The fundamental 
American constitutional ethos is the idea of limited government, the presumption of which 
holds all residual authority remains in the private sphere.”). 
167. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 157–65 (proposing ethical 
argument “[g]overnment may not coerce intimate acts”). 
168. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
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was right to resist this categorization. The original understanding of a 
constitutional provision or the plain meaning of its text are legitimate 
subjects of constitutional inquiry, which is to say that they wield authority 
within constitutional practice; historical and textual argument are 
therefore modalities inasmuch as they advance propositions with respect 
to those subjects. Pathos, by contrast, is not a subject of constitutional 
inquiry and is not a source of constitutional authority. This is not a 
metaphysical truth, and there are domains—spousal relations, for 
example—in which pathos is in fact a source of authority. But in 
constitutional law, pathos is better described as a feature of constitutional 
conversation, a means rather than an end. The appeal to pathos occurs not 
because pathos offers information about substantive constitutional 
content but because appealing to pathos helps win constitutional 
arguments.169 Pathetic legal argument, then, is a mode of persuasion as to 
the substance and valence of particular legal propositions: Some outcome 
must be thus because deep down in your heart you know thus to be true.  
Let us return to Justice Scalia’s opinion in Casey. This Article intimated 
above that the argument type in play was not doctrinal,170 but that 
conclusion was premature. A doctrinal argument asserts that some result 
follows from analysis of controlling precedent. But there is more than one 
way of persuading someone that that assertion is true. The most obvious 
ways, at least to lawyers, are by syllogism, enthymeme, and example.171 A 
syllogism is a form of deductive reasoning that infers a conclusion from 
two or more premises: 
“Dred Scott is wrong.” (major premise) 
“Roe is like Dred Scott.” (minor premise) 
“Roe is wrong.” (conclusion) 
An enthymeme is a syllogism that is complete but for unspoken 
assumptions:  
“Roe is wrong because it is like Dred Scott.”  
The major premise (“Dred Scott is wrong”) is unstated, leaving only 
the minor premise (“Roe is like Dred Scott”) and the conclusion (“Roe is 
wrong.”).172 Reasoning by example has an inductive rather than a 
deductive logical structure: 
“Dred Scott uses substantive due process.”  
“Dred Scott is wrong.” 
                                                 
169. See Aristotle, supra note 1, bk. 1, ch. 2, § 7 (arguing rhetoric is “partly a method 
(like dialectic) with no necessary subject of its own but partly a practical art derived from 
ethics and politics on the basis of its conventional uses”). 
170. See supra text accompanying notes 163–164. 
171. See Aristotle, supra note 1, bk. 1, ch. 2 (“Every one who effects persuasion through 
proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way.”). 
172. Dred Scott is sufficiently anticanonical that this particular enthymeme could 
suppress both the major premise and the conclusion and still be well understood: “Roe is 
like Dred Scott.” 
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“Therefore cases that use substantive due process are wrong.” 
Enthymeme in particular is a common feature of doctrinal argument 
in federal courts, for doctrinal arguments often reason from the assumed 
but unstated premise that prior Supreme Court decisions or appellate 
decisions from within the deciding court’s circuit are formally binding. 
A very different way of advancing a doctrinal argument is to place 
significant emphasis on the opinion’s author, not because the author is 
controlling authority but because the author is worthy of respect. The 
Supreme Court, for example, frequently identifies opinions written by 
Richard Posner even when they are majority panel opinions, a courtesy 
granted few other lower court judges.173 A 2004 study analyzing citations 
from 1998 to 2000 found that Judge Posner was more cited outside his 
own circuit than any other appellate judge.174 Antitrust opinions written 
by Robert Bork or Frank Easterbrook,175 civil procedure opinions written 
by Charles Clark,176 and lower court opinions authored by judges who 
later became Supreme Court Justices or who were on the Court but riding 
                                                 
173. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 131 S. Ct. 2860, 2864 (2011) (citing CFTC 
v. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 701 F.2d 653, 656 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.)); Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. 
Ct. 2652, 2675 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing In re Polis, 217 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 
2000) (Posner, J.)); Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1803 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Tregenza v. Great Am. Commc’ns 
Co., 12 F.3d 717, 721–22 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.)). 
174. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An 
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 23, 50 (2004). This result is partly 
though not entirely explained by Judge Posner’s extraordinary productivity. See id. at 54. 
175. E.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2212 (2010) (citing 
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.)); Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 635 (1989), as authority based in part on 
his “background in antitrust law”); Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 338 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 564–68 (7th Cir. 
1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part)). See also Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, 
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889, 897 (2007) (citing Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at 
War with Itself (Free Press 1993) (1978)); id. at 895, 897, 905, 907 (citing Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 Antitrust L.J. 135 (1984) 
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements]; id. at 914 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 
Bork, supra); id. at 910, 914 (citing Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra). 
176. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Dioguardi v. 
Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944)) (discussing Judge Clark’s ruling interpreting pleading 
standards six years after publication of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of which he was a 
leading drafter); Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 297 (1973) (discussing Hackner v. 
Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1941)) (citing Judge Clark’s influence in 
interpreting class action rules and adoption of his interpretation by other federal courts), 
superseded by statute, Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 
as recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 557, 566–67 
(2005).  
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circuit often receive special treatment as well.177 If the first means of 
doctrinal persuasion is based on logic, this means is based on character. 
Finally, a judge wishing to rely on a prior precedent or doctrinally 
established proposition could do so by appealing to the emotions of the 
audience. It is infrequent that a judicial precedent reliably stirs emotion, 
but Dred Scott is the rare opinion that has that capacity. The Court both 
abided the status of slavery as a perpetual feature of American politics and 
denied that black Americans ever could be U.S. citizens.178 When Justice 
Scalia sought to counter the “poignant” joint opinion in Casey, he chose 
carefully and well. And in evoking Dred Scott through narrative, he 
distanced himself from any particular proposition or feature of Chief 
Justice Taney’s opinion. The point was less to reason in conventional terms 
than to set a mood. 
The three modes of persuasion just described align with the three 
forms of rhetoric Aristotle identified: logos, ethos, and pathos. Each form 
may be used to modify a particular subject of constitutional argument. 
That is, a judge may seek to persuade the audience as to the substance or 
valence of arguments from history, text, structure, precedent, and 
consequences through any of the three modes of persuasion. Thus, 
doctrinalism as a category of constitutional argument may be further 
subdivided into logical, ethical, and, as with Justice Scalia’s Casey opinion, 
pathetic varieties. Each of the four other established “modalities” may also 
be parsed in this way.  
To illustrate the basic idea, I provide examples below of how each 
mode of persuasion—logos, ethos, and pathos—may modify each of five 
common types of constitutional argument: text, history, structure, 
doctrine, and consequences. These argument types are approved by 
Bobbitt179 and a version of each also finds favor with Richard Fallon, 
whose typology of argument is frequently cited by commentators.180 The 
cross-categorizations discussed below—the application of logos, pathos, 
                                                 
177. See, e.g., Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 1281 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (designating First Circuit opinion Hartford Fin. 
Sys., Inc. v. Fla. Software Servs., Inc., 712 F.2d 724 (1st Cir. 1983), as written by Judge 
Breyer)); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75–76 (1873) (citing Corfield v. 
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3320)) (discussing decision by Justice 
Washington in circuit court); id. at 97–98 (Field, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 116 (Bradley, J., 
dissenting) (same); Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.1 (1792) (discussing circuit 
court actions in three cases that together included five of six Justices of Court). 
178. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404–05 (1857) (noting slaves were 
considered “subordinate and inferior class of beings” and thus had no right to citizenship), 
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
179. As I discuss below, Bobbitt identifies what I have called “consequences” with 
prudential argument. See infra text accompanying notes 278–281. 
180. See Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 14, at 1194–209 (outlining five 
general types of accepted constitutional argument as deriving from text, Framers’ intent, 
constitutional theory, precedent, and values). Fallon refers to what this Article calls 
structural argument as “constitutional theory.” Id. at 1200–02. 
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and ethos to particular subjects of constitutional argument—represent 
ideal types. What follows should not be taken either to suggest neat lines 
of division between various categories or to suggest that those categories 
do not sometimes overlap in whole or in part. It is important, however, to 
conduct this exercise in some detail, as the approach to constitutional 
argument it reveals is unfamiliar. Some readers will intuitively resist the 
proposition, defended below, that pathetic constitutional argument stands 
in parallel rather than adverse relation to its logical or ethical analogs. 
 1. Text. — Textual constitutional argument centers around 
discovering the meaning of the words used in the Constitution. A textual 
argument may consider either the historical or the contemporary meaning 
of constitutional language, but original-meaning textualism overlaps 
considerably with historical argument.181 Although many textualists are 
formalists, textual argument need not be formalistic. A broad inquiry into 
the meaning of a text may reveal its meaning to be idiomatic, colloquial, or 
a term of art. The meaning of a text may also be understood at many 
different levels of generality; identifying an argument as textualist does 
not ipso facto commit the argument to any particular level of 
abstraction.182 
Persuading a listener that constitutional text has some particular 
meaning may be accomplished in any number of ways. Among the most 
common today are the use of contemporaneous dictionaries and reference 
to usage in canonical texts such as The Federalist Papers. We will take up 
The Federalist Papers and related sources in the discussion of historical 
argument below. Dictionary arguments may be described either as logical 
or as ethical forms of persuasion. They are logical insofar as the speaker 
assumes that the dictionary will be treated as controlling the definition of 
the word—as noted, it may not. Dictionary definitions are ethical insofar 
as, apart from whether the dictionary definition is dispositive, a dictionary 
is considered an unbiased and respected source of the definition of words. 
One approach to textual argument that is more surely in the logical 
mode is what Akhil Amar calls intratextualism.183 In engaging in 
intratextualism, “[T]he interpreter tries to read a contested word or 
phrase that appears in the Constitution in light of another passage in the 
Constitution featuring the same (or a very similar) word or phrase.”184 
Thus, an intratextualist seeking to define “inferior” officers in order to 
understand the scope of the President’s appointments power would look 
elsewhere in the Constitution to uses of the same word—in this example, 
                                                 
181. Bobbitt identifies textual argument solely with contemporary definitions. See 
Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 25–26. 
182. See Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 14 (2011) [hereinafter Balkin, Originalism] 
(describing textualist approach attending to whether text describes rule, standard, or 
principle). 
183. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 748 (1999) 
[hereinafter Amar, Intratextualism]. 
184. Id. 
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in the document’s references to “inferior” tribunals and “inferior” 
courts.185 The form of argument is enthymematic: Constitutional 
provision A has some particular meaning because constitutional provision 
B has that meaning, on the unstated premise that the use of language is 
consistent across the Constitution. 
Amar uses McCulloch v. Maryland186 as one of his prime examples of 
intratextualism,187 but McCulloch is also useful as a powerful example of 
what we might term ethical textualism. Recall that the first question in 
McCulloch was whether the federal government had the constitutional 
power to incorporate a bank.188 Maryland, contesting the constitutionality 
of the Bank of the United States, argued that the word “necessary” as used 
in the Necessary and Proper Clause should be read restrictively, as to limit 
Congress’s power to legislate to only those means that are indispensible to 
its enumerated ends.189 In rebutting this argument, Chief Justice Marshall 
argues, in one of the opinion’s most famous passages, that the word 
“necessary” should not be so constrained: 
The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the 
welfare of a nation essentially depends. It must have been the 
intention of those who gave these powers, to insure, as far as 
human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This 
could not be done by confiding the choice of means to such 
narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt 
any which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to 
the end. This provision is made in a constitution intended to 
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the 
various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by 
which government should, in all future time, execute its powers, 
would have been to change, entirely, the character of the 
instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code.190 
Here, the argument for a particular reading of the text follows from 
the fact that “those who gave these powers” had particular aims in mind. It 
does not follow directly, in the originalist sense that might simply 
assimilate the meaning of the word “necessary” to the intentions of its 
authors. Rather, it follows in the sense that a contrary reading would 
disappoint the Founders and diminish their work: It would “give the 
                                                 
185. See id.; see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (granting Congress power to “constitute 
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court”); id. art. III, § 1 (providing that “[t]he judicial Power 
of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”). 
186. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
187. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 183, at 755–57 (discussing Chief Justice 
Marshall’s cross-reference of Necessary and Proper Clause with use of term “absolutely 
necessary” in U.S. Const. art. I, § 10). 
188. The second question was whether a state had the power to tax the bank’s 
operations. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 425–35. 
189. See id. at 413. 
190. Id. at 415 (emphasis omitted). 
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Constitution ‘the properties of a legal code.’” Respect for the “character of 
the instrument” therefore pushes toward a particular reading of its 
language. A narrow reading is beneath the U.S. Constitution. 
Pathetic argument may be textualism’s most elusive mode. Textualist 
claims tend to have a positivist cast and are frequently set in opposition to 
consequentialist arguments likely to engage the emotions of the American 
people. At the same time, the most consistent textualists in the Court’s 
history, Justice Black and Justice Scalia, are also among the Court’s most 
gifted rhetoricians. It would be surprising if they could achieve that status 
without ever resorting to pathetic argument, including in instances in 
which the text is the subject of argument. Consider the following passage, 
also from Justice Scalia’s partial dissent in Casey: 
[T]he issue in these cases [is] not whether the power of a woman 
to abort her unborn child is a “liberty” in the absolute sense; or 
even whether it is a liberty of great importance to many women. 
Of course it is both. The issue is whether it is a liberty protected 
by the Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not.191 
Justice Scalia then explains the basis for his conclusion: Abortion is 
not mentioned in the Constitution and has long been subject to prohibition 
in the United States.192 But that is the second part of the argument. Justice 
Scalia in fact begins his case in chief with his reference to reproductive 
freedom as the “power of a woman to abort her unborn child.”193 This 
phrasing implicitly likens abortion to murder, which is also a liberty 
interest that does not count as one for constitutional purposes. The 
argumentation works subliminally, eliciting disgust for abortion in 
advance of any logical argument for including or excluding it from 
constitutional protection. 
 2. History. — Historical constitutional argument is frequently 
identified with some version of originalism, a family of theories that hold 
that either constitutional meaning or the appropriate resolution of 
constitutional controversies does or should proceed from the way in which 
the text was originally understood or the way in which the drafters of 
some operative constitutional provision would have expected the 
controversy to be adjudicated. These broad qualifications of the originalist 
position underscore the fact that originalism cannot easily be described as 
a single theory. Previous efforts to catalog the different versions of 
originalism have tended to distinguish those versions that train on the 
original meaning of the Constitution’s text from those that seek guidance 
in the intentions or expectations of its ratifiers or drafters,194 or else (and 
                                                 
191. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. E.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611, 620 
(1999). 
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nonexclusively) to identify the level of generality at which the adjudicator 
is to assess the meaning of constitutional text.195 
Distinguishing forms of constitutional persuasion from subjects of 
constitutional inquiry helps us to identify a different set of categories to 
apply to argumentation grounded in constitutional history. In so doing it 
helps us better to articulate both what distinguishes originalist from 
nonoriginalist approaches and what distinguishes different originalist 
arguments from each other.  
Original-meaning originalism arose in response to two trenchant 
critiques of the once-dominant original-intent formulation. First, it is 
difficult, perhaps impossible, to isolate a single original intent underlying 
provisions passed by multimember bodies with different perspectives, 
ideologies, agendas, and degrees of forethought.196 Second, there is 
significant evidence that a large number of constitutional drafters would 
not have endorsed intentionalist interpretive premises, raising the 
discomfiting (for intentionalists) prospect that the original intent behind 
the Constitution is to disclaim original-intent interpretation.197 The force 
of these criticisms was amplified by the fact that the conception of 
constitutional authority underlying original-intent originalism was initially 
undertheorized. Original-meaning originalism emerged as a more fully 
theorized alternative. The inquiry into original meaning is said to be 
appropriate because the Constitution is a written text: To the degree it is 
binding at all, it is binding because that text is authoritative, and the 
“meaning” of a text is logically supplied by its original meaning. The 
predominant original-meaning theories are best understood, then, as 
forms of logical historical argument.198 The historical inquiry is limited by 
                                                 
195. See, e.g., Balkin, Originalism, supra note 182, at 23–24 (articulating form of 
originalism that “pays attention to the reasons why constitutional designers choose 
particular types of language”); Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 48–50 (1985) (arguing 
level of abstraction of specificity by which we define authorial intention may determine 
content of that intention). 
196. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
Rev. 204, 213–17 (1980) (arguing that for certain provisions, amendment’s framers may 
have had determinate intent, while adopters had no intent or indeterminate intent). 
197. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. 
Rev. 885, 887–88 (1985) (“As understood by its late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century proponents, the original intent relevant to constitutional discourse was not that of 
the Philadelphia framers, but rather that of the parties to the constitutional compact—the 
states as political entities.”). 
198. Many nominally intentionalist originalists also ground their normative vision in 
the status of the text as binding authority, or at least on the common assumption that the 
text binds us. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, 
Original Intent, and Judicial Review xi (1999) (“[A] jurisprudence of original intent . . . seeks 
to recover the textual intentions of the ratifiers in order to bring them to bear in settling 
current constitutional disputes.”); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is that English 
You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 San Diego L. 
Rev. 967, 969 (2004) (“[O]ne cannot interpret texts without reference to the intentions of 
some author.”); Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional 
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the logic of the argument from authority that undergirds the original-
meaning theory: It includes only those sources that illuminate how a 
reasonable person at the time would have understood the meaning of a 
particular text. 
It is unsurprising that a version of originalism that predominates 
among legal scholars is in the logical mode; academic norms demand 
nothing less. But academics are famously unburdened by the need to 
persuade nonacademics of the validity of their ideas, and it is not at all 
obvious that original-meaning originalism is the dominant mode outside of 
legal academe. Nonacademic public discourse around originalism does not 
tend to distinguish original meaning from original intent,199 and 
originalism in the courts is variously consistent with both theories.200 
Reference to the intentions and expectations of various drafters, to 
statements offered at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, and to 
the writings of Madison or Hamilton in The Federalist Papers are the 
common stock of originalist opinions,201 and yet all of these sources more 
evidently support original intent than original meaning. 
Academic supporters of original-meaning originalism often defend 
such references as providing examples of how reasonable or informed 
people would have understood the words used in the Constitution,202 but 
the practice in the courts seems to confirm the pull of intentionalist 
                                                                                                                 
Interpretation, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 703, 709 (2009) (defining “original intended meaning” as 
“the meaning that textual language had for the relevant enactors”). Contrary to original-
meaning originalists, this school identifies the meaning of a text with how its authors or 
ratifiers would have expected the text to be understood. To the degree that an intentionalist 
grounds his theory of authority in this linguistic argument, such an individual is engaged in 
logical historical argument. 
199. See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Geo. L.J. 657, 688 (2009) (“[That] 
original intent and original meaning are but two sides of the same interpretative coin . . . is 
untrue as a matter of constitutional theory but true as a matter of constitutional politics.”). 
200. Compare Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (espousing original-
meaning originalism), with id. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (using purposive originalism), 
and with Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1683 (2012) 
[hereinafter Greene, Original Intent] (noting ways originalism as practiced in courts is 
consistent with original-intent theory). 
201. See Greene, Original Intent, supra note 200, at 1685 (“The Federalist . . . [is] one of 
the two main sources of the intentions of the Constitution’s drafters.”). 
202. See Justice Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on 
Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Original Meaning Jurisprudence: A Sourcebook 101, 103 (1987) (“[T]he expressions 
of the Framers . . . . are strong indications of what the most knowledgeable people of the 
time understood the words to mean.”); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 Geo. L.J. 1113, 1133 
(2003) (noting Farrand’s Records “are an excellent, first-rate resource of rich insight into 
original linguistic meaning”); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 
15 Const. Comment. 529, 537 (1998) (reviewing Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics 
and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (1996)) (“[T]he framers’ or ratifiers’ comments 
about a particular phrase or provision are often a fairly good reflection of what that phrase 
or provision commonly was understood to mean.”). 
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reasoning.203 Most telling in this regard is the low opinion many 
originalist judicial writings appear to have for anti-Federalists. 
Discounting the views expressed by Brutus204 or The Federal Farmer205 
in favor of those expressed by Publius is difficult to explain on the logic of 
original-meaning originalism.206 But once we understand that historical 
arguments are advanced at least as much in the ethical as in the logical 
mode, it is easy to explain a preference for those who supported rather 
than opposed ratification of the Constitution. Federalists, to paraphrase 
Marshall, are “approved authors.”207 
Conceived as an ethical mode of historical argument, original-intent 
originalism is able to respond to the criticisms that gave rise to original 
meaning. An adjudicator who advances an ethical historical argument has 
no need to “aggregate” the intentions of multiple authors, because he self-
consciously privileges particular draftsmen.208 The intentions of the 
Constitution’s authors as to the appropriate interpretive technique are, 
likewise, not conclusive when the reason to refer to those intentions—the 
persuasive character of the Framers—permits them to be deployed 
selectively. The Framers’ technical views on interpretive method may be 
less culturally salient, and therefore less available as an ethical resource, 
than their views on constitutional substance. In addition, unlike dominant 
                                                 
203. See Greene, Original Intent, supra note 200, at 1690 (noting “deep reliance” on 
intentionalist sources, contrasted with “shallow reliance” on original-meaning sources). 
204. The writings of Brutus have been attributed to Robert Yates. See 2 The Complete 
Anti-Federalist, Objections of Non-Signers of the Constitution and Major Series of Essays at 
the Outset 358 (Herbert J. Storing with Murray Dry eds., 1981) (explaining arguments for 
and against attribution of Brutus essays to Yates). 
205. The Federal Farmer might have been Richard Henry Lee, though this has been 
disputed. See id. at 103 (discussing limited contemporary source material identifying Lee as 
author). 
206. See Greene, Original Intent, supra note 200, at 1692–94 (comparing equally 
credible, widely available, but largely ignored anti-Federalist sources with commonly cited 
Federalist sources). 
207. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 (1819). Identifying some 
originalist arguments as ethical illuminates other curious practices as well. For example, the 
Supreme Court appears to prefer Federalist essays written by Madison, a former President 
often described as the Father of the Constitution, to those written by Hamilton, a notorious 
(and literal) bastard. See Ira C. Lupu, The Most-Cited Federalist Papers, 15 Const. Comment. 
403, 410 (1998) (noting Court’s approximately equal citation of papers by Hamilton and 
Madison, despite Hamilton having written twice as many). On Hamilton’s reputation and 
lineage, see Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton 5, 8–16 (2004) (describing Hamilton’s 
temperament and backgrounds of his unmarried parents). 
208. Original-intent originalists also tend, understandably on the ethical view, to 
privilege historical figures, such as Washington or Jefferson, who had little or no role in 
drafting the Constitution. Washington presided over the Constitutional Convention but did 
not participate actively in the debates. See 6 Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington, 
Patriot and President, 112–13 (1975) (describing Washington’s limited role at Convention). 
Though hardly an indifferent observer, Jefferson was in France during the Constitution’s 
drafting and ratification. See William Howard Adams, The Paris Years of Thomas Jefferson 
263–65 (1997) (discussing Jefferson’s views on proposed Constitution). 
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versions of original-meaning originalism, a form of originalism grounded 
in ethos permits reference to the original subjective expectations of the 
drafters as a direct source of authority. Again, the contribution of those 
expectations to the argument at issue is not in supplying the meaning of 
constitutional terms or phrases but rather in drawing on the views of 
heroic figures held out as specially representative of the American 
constitutional tradition. 
Historical argument need not be limited to some particular 
foundational moment. Judicial references to “postenactment legislative 
history,” sometimes criticized as bearing an uncertain relationship to 
textualism or originalism,209 are not uncommon in U.S. courts.210 Such 
references may address the early practices of the American people or their 
leaders, as for example when nineteenth-century state or federal practice 
is used to elucidate the meaning of the Establishment Clause.211 Such 
references may also speak more broadly to a set of narratives we tell 
ourselves about ourselves: our stable political institutions,212 our status as 
a Judeo-Christian nation,213 our tolerance of dissent,214 and so forth. Thus, 
Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence trains not only on the original meaning of the 
Constitution but also on “the longstanding traditions of American 
society.”215 This kind of originalism is readily, and appropriately, 
characterized as “ethical.” The traditions invoked speak most directly to 
the nation’s “small c” constitution; it is as if America herself has vouched 
for the propositions those traditions are meant to support. 
Certain ethical claims are so deeply felt that they predictably engage 
the emotions. In Texas v. Johnson, the Court held that a state could not 
                                                 
209. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 662 n.28 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (calling postenactment legislative history “least reliable source of authority for 
ascertaining the intent of any provision’s drafters”). 
210. See, e.g., N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 530–34 (1982) (citing several 
pieces of postenactment legislative history in interpreting Title IX). 
211. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 104–06 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(citing nineteenth-century sources supporting narrow interpretations of Establishment 
Clause); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788–91 (1983) (discussing historical practice in 
interpretation of Establishment Clause). 
212. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144–45 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable two-
party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and effective 
government.”). 
213. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 894 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(highlighting commonalities in historical religious practices in United States). 
214. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any 
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”). 
215. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 
U.S. 502, 520 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he Constitution contains no right to 
abortion. It is not to be found in the longstanding traditions of our society . . . .”). 
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criminally punish someone for burning an American flag in protest.216 
Chief Justice Rehnquist begins his dissenting opinion, which Justice White 
and Justice O’Connor joined, as follows: “In holding this Texas statute 
unconstitutional, the Court ignores Justice Holmes’ familiar aphorism that 
‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic.’”217 That opening is more 
explicit than usual that logic is not the only mode of persuasion in 
constitutional law. 
The dissent proceeds to demonstrate, less through prose than verse, 
the “unique position” the American flag holds as a national symbol.218 
Rehnquist’s dissent quotes from Ralph Waldo Emerson’s “Concord Hymn,” 
which envisions the colonial flag flying above the first shots of the 
American Revolution;219 it excerpts generously from the lyrics of the Star-
Spangled Banner;220 and it recites all sixty lines of John Greenleaf 
Whittier’s “Barbara Frietchie.” The poem tells the (likely apocryphal) tale 
of a nonagenarian woman who waved the Union flag in the face of 
Stonewall Jackson’s advancing Confederate division during the rebels’ 
march through Frederick, Maryland.221 Whittier takes the reader on a 
journey through the lush autumn landscape of rural Maryland, 
Apple- and peach-tree fruited deep,  
Fair as a garden of the Lord.222  
For those for whom the poem is effective, the bosom begins to swell 
about here: 
Forty flags with their silver stars, 
Forty flags with their crimson bars, 
Flapped in the morning wind: the sun 
Of noon looked down, and saw not one. 
Up rose old Barbara Frietchie then, 
Bowed with her fourscore years and ten; 
Bravest of all in Frederick town, 
She took up the flag the men hauled down; 
In her attic-window the staff she set, 
To show that one heart was loyal yet.223 
On Whittier’s telling, Frietchie’s heroism moves General Jackson 
himself, who upon seeing her pick up a fallen flag, orders his men to hold 
their fire: 
Quick, as it fell, from the broken staff 
Dame Barbara snatched the silken scarf; 
                                                 
216. 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (concluding state’s interest in preserving symbolic value 
of flag insufficient to justify criminal punishment). 
217. Id. at 421 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
218. Id. at 422. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 423. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 424. 
223. Id. 
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She leaned far out on the window-sill, 
And shook it forth with a royal will. 
’Shoot, if you must, this old gray head, 
But spare your country’s flag,’ she said. 
A shade of sadness, a blush of shame, 
Over the face of the leader came; 
The nobler nature within him stirred 
To life at that woman’s deed and word: 
‘Who touches a hair of yon gray head 
Dies like a dog! March on!’ he said.224 
Rehnquist’s use of the poem is not originalist in the traditional sense. 
The opinion is not directed at the original meaning of the First Amendment 
or the intentions of its drafters. The argument embedded within the Chief 
Justice’s use of poetry is nonetheless, as he informs the reader, historical. 
The opinion scans American history from a bird’s eye rather than at a 
point and identifies a reverence for the flag as an idée fixe. Rehnquist then 
seeks to communicate that reverence by sowing within the reader the 
deep pride of patriotism. The subject matter is historical, the mode of 
persuasion pathetic. 
3. Structure. — Structural argument may refer to more than one 
approach to constitutional interpretation. It is commonly associated with 
the work of Charles Black and the series of lectures that would become the 
celebrated Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law.225 Black 
believed that certain constitutional outcomes followed from the 
presuppositions underlying the institutional arrangements the 
Constitution established. The clearest example of this genus of structural 
argument is Chief Justice Marshall’s argument in McCulloch as to why 
Maryland may not tax the Bank of the United States. Doing so would imply 
a sovereignty of state over nation that is inconsistent with the structure of 
the U.S. government and its representative institutions.226 
Structural argument relates to what Fallon refers to as “constitutional 
theory” argument. By this he means arguments grounded in particular 
constitutional arrangements that, unlike narrow interpretivism, “claim to 
understand the Constitution as a whole, or a particular provision of it, by 
providing an account of the values, purposes, or political theory in light of 
which the Constitution or certain elements of its language and structure 
are most intelligible.”227 Fallon associates different versions of 
“constitutional theory” argument with different levels of altitude from 
which the interpreter assesses the relevant constitutional values or 
                                                 
224. Id. at 425. 
225. Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (1969). 
226. See id. at 15 (“In [McCulloch], perhaps the greatest of our constitutional cases, 
judgment is reached not fundamentally on the basis of that kind of textual exegesis which 
we tend to regard as normal, but on the basis of reasoning from the total structure which the 
text has created.”). 
227. Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 14, at 1200 (classifying Black’s 
arguments as “middle level of theoretical argumentation”). 
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purposes.228 Thus, a high-altitude theory is one that, like John Hart Ely’s 
representation-reinforcement theory, specifies a particular value or set of 
values underlying the constitutional structure and seeks to solve 
constitutional controversies wholly or largely in light of those values.229 
Black, who identifies not one but several values embedded within the 
Constitution’s structures and relationships,230 sits at a medium level of 
generality.231 Purposive approaches to interpretation of specific 
constitutional provisions sit at the most “particularistic” level of generality 
among those approaches that Fallon includes within this category.232 
As with text and history, we may additionally distinguish structural 
arguments by reference to distinctive methods of persuasion. Logical 
structuralism is not hard to find. For example, in INS v. Chadha, the Court 
held that structural principles of bicameralism and presentment 
prohibited Congress from enacting a one-house veto enabling it to 
override the President’s decision to suspend deportation of an alien.233 
The logic of the decision was straightforward. Major premise: Congress 
has the power to make laws only through the lawmaking procedures 
established in Article I. Minor premise: The decision to force deportation 
of someone for whom deportation had been suspended is a legislative act; 
it repeals or amends the discretionary authority previously granted to the 
Attorney General.234 Conclusion: The one-house veto exercised in this case 
is unconstitutional. 
The flip side of Chadha’s rule is the nondelegation doctrine, which 
notionally prevents excessive conferral of discretion to the Executive to 
engage in fundamentally legislative activities.235 The nondelegation 
doctrine is also typically justified in logical structural terms, as is the 
related (and equally moribund) doctrine preventing the President from 
                                                 
228. See id. at 1200–02 (explaining three different levels of analysis). 
229. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 73–101 (1980) (identifying political 
process value immanent within constitutional structure); see also David A.J. Richards, 
Toleration and the Constitution 67–68 (1989) (defending theory placing respect for 
individual freedom of conscience at center of constitutional interpretation). 
230. See Black, supra note 225, at 11–21 (identifying values of federal supremacy, free 
travel rights, and national economic unity).  
231. See Fallon, Constructivist Coherence, supra note 14, at 1200. 
232. Id. at 1201. 
233. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (arguing structural constitutional constraints supersede 
efficiency concerns). 
234. See id. at 954 (“Congress’ decision to deport Chadha—no less than Congress’ 
original choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, 
involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way . . . .”); see 
also Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution 370 n.* (2012) (presenting “two 
formal proofs of the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto”). 
235. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001) (holding 
section of Clean Air Act assigning determination of national ambient air quality standards to 
EPA did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529–42 (1935) (finding section of National Industrial Recovery 
Act permitting President to issue “codes of fair competition” unconstitutional). 
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exercising lawmaking power with or without purported delegation. As 
Justice Black wrote for the Court in the Steel Seizure case, the most lucid 
example of this doctrine at work, “In the framework of our Constitution, 
the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes 
the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”236 Notably, Justice Jackson’s more 
celebrated concurring opinion, though far less formalist, also exemplifies 
logical structuralism. Under Justice Jackson’s famous tripartite 
categorization of Presidential authority, that authority varies with the level 
of congressional support not just because the opinion of Congress is 
worthy of respect but because congressional authority either adds to or 
subtracts from that of the President, as if the power of the political 
branches were a matter of arithmetic rather than, well, power.237 
Ethical structuralism is also relatively easy to find, once one knows 
what to look for. This is because what Bobbitt terms ethical argument is in 
many ways continuous with structural argument. Each is, Bobbitt writes in 
Constitutional Interpretation, “an inferred set of arguments” that “do not 
depend on the construction of any particular piece of text, but rather the 
necessary relationships that can be inferred from the overall arrangement 
expressed in the text.”238 As Patrick Gudridge writes, “Ethical argument, 
Bobbitt seems to think, takes [Charles] Black’s approach one step further: 
it generalizes ideas of structure to encompass notions of individual rights 
directly.”239 The problem in trying to understand what makes ethical 
argument unique is that Black was perfectly willing to extend his 
arguments to cases implicating individual rights—indeed, rights cases are 
among his core examples.240 To the degree, then, that we are persuaded 
that the ethos underlying a particular ethical argument is embedded 
within our constitutional arrangements—as with Bobbitt’s ethos of limited 
government—it appears that ethical argument is structural argument, if 
often at a different level of abstraction than Black’s version. 
Consider Bolling v. Sharpe.241 The rule of Brown v. Board of 
Education242 forbidding segregation of public schools under the Equal 
                                                 
236. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). 
237. See id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
238. Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 15, at 20. 
239. Gudridge, supra note 165, at 1978; see also Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, 
supra note 15, at 20 (“Structural argument infers rules from the powers granted to 
governments; ethical argument, by contrast, infers rules from the powers denied to 
government.”). 
240. See Black, supra note 225, at 8–13 (discussing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 
(1965) (striking down Texas Constitution’s provision prohibiting members of Armed Forces 
who became Texas residents due to their station in Texas from voting in Texas)); id. at 15–
17 (discussing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1868) (finding Nevada tax on leaving state 
violated fundamental right to travel)); id. at 35–39 (discussing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652 (1925) (incorporating First Amendment limits on federal power to states through 
Fourteenth Amendment)). 
241. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
242. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Protection Clause applies identically to the schools of the federally 
administered District of Columbia even though the Equal Protection Clause 
does not by its terms apply to the federal government. No obvious textual 
argument explains this result243 but, the Court states, “In view of our 
decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining 
racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same 
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”244 
The putative “unthinkability” of refusing to apply equal protection 
principles to the federal government has come in for serious criticism.245 
As Michael McConnell writes, “The decision of the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to impose its limitations only on the states, far 
from being ‘unthinkable,’ reflects their understanding of the institutional 
capacities of various units of government within our system.”246 Ely piles 
on: “[U]nthinkable in what sense?” he asks, one page after referring to the 
opinion as “gibberish.”247 
Many of Bolling’s numerous critics assume its mode of persuasion to 
be logical rather than ethical. It is obviously quite “thinkable” textually that 
the constitutional regime with respect to individual rights would be 
different for states and the federal government. The First and the 
Fourteenth Amendments explicitly refer to Congress and to states, 
respectively, in establishing constitutional standards for treatment of 
individuals.248 Neither is it unthinkable structurally under the logic of our 
federal arrangements and the Fourteenth Amendment. As McConnell 
notes, various structural guarantees aim to insulate the federal 
government from dominance by any particular group of interests, thereby 
making it less likely that the various branches of the federal government 
would combine in opposition to minorities.249 But Brown’s rejection of the 
                                                 
243. But see Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 
Va. L. Rev. 493, 594–98 (2013) (arguing Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause applies 
certain equality guarantees against the federal government). 
244. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500. 
245. See David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 
93 Geo. L.J. 1253, 1257–61 (2005) (collecting criticisms). 
246. Michael W. McConnell, McConnell, J., Concurring in the Judgment, in What Brown 
v. Board of Education Should Have Said 158, 167 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001). 
247. Ely, supra note 229, at 32–33. 
248. U.S. Const. amend. I; id. amend. XIV, cl. 1. 
249. See McConnell, supra note 246, at 167 (“By virtue of [its] greater diversity, the 
federal government is less likely to countenance the systematic oppression of minority 
groups without our midst.”); see also The Federalist No. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing advantages of large republics in mitigating effects of faction); 
The Federalist No. 51, supra, at 320 (James Madison) (arguing power will be limited under 
new Constitution by “contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several 
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their 
proper places”). As Richard Primus has noted, since Bolling was decided, the Supreme Court 
has never found that a federal statute, regulation, or practice unconstitutionally 
discriminated against racial minorities. Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 
975, 978 (2004). As of 2004, when Primus conducted his study, there had been only twelve 
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doctrine of “separate but equal” meant not only to shift doctrine in a 
formal sense but to chart the country on a new ethical course.250 Identity 
between the standards limiting racial discrimination that apply to states 
and the federal government was a structural reality, or so Chief Justice 
Warren argued, because our ethos required it. 
The third mode of persuasion and the one of greatest interest, 
pathetic argument, likewise may be, and has been, applied to the 
constitutional structure. The Court held in Arizona v. United States that 
states are preempted from, in effect, creating their own immigration 
policies that supplement federal immigration enforcement.251 Dissenting 
from this holding, Justice Scalia chose to end his opinion by highlighting 
the problems to which the Arizona legislature believed it was responding: 
As is often the case, discussion of the dry legalities that are the 
proper object of our attention suppresses the very human 
realities that gave rise to the suit. Arizona bears the brunt of the 
country’s illegal immigration problem. Its citizens feel 
themselves under siege by large numbers of illegal immigrants 
who invade their property, strain their social services, and even 
place their lives in jeopardy. Federal officials have been unable to 
remedy the problem, and indeed have recently shown that they 
are unwilling to do so. Thousands of Arizona’s estimated 400,000 
illegal immigrants—including not just children but men and 
women under 30—are now assured immunity from enforcement, 
and will be able to compete openly with Arizona citizens for 
employment.252 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion was almost entirely devoted to a 
structural argument: that in the absence of an express congressional or 
constitutional prohibition, border control is a residual and significant 
element of state sovereignty.253 Most of the opinion is, broadly speaking, 
in the logical mode. He cites Vattel’s treatise on the law of nations to show 
                                                                                                                 
reported cases in which an African American litigant had succeeded in a lower federal court 
or a state court on a claim of racial discrimination brought against the federal government. 
In only one such case did the decision result in invalidation of a federal statute or codified 
federal regulation. See id. at 991–92 (citing Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 323 F.2d 
959 (4th Cir. 1963)). 
250. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“This Nation has a 
moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated 
society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children.”). 
251. See 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (“Arizona may have understandable frustrations 
with the problems caused by illegal immigration . . . but the State may not pursue policies 
that undermine federal law.”). 
252. Id. at 2522 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
253. See id. at 2511 (“As a sovereign, Arizona has the inherent power to exclude 
persons from its territory, subject only to those limitations expressed by the Constitution or 
constitutionally imposed by Congress.”). 
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the original understanding of the power to exclude,254 and demonstrates 
through citation to early laws and cases that immigration law remained 
the province of state governments even long after ratification.255 But he 
seals the deal by evoking one of our basest emotions: fear. Fear of crime, 
fear of death, and, perhaps as bad in lean economic times, fear of job loss. 
 4. Doctrine. — Doctrinal argument is argument grounded directly in 
the holdings of relevant judicial and political precedents or advanced by 
reference to a purposive or justificatory theory derived from those 
holdings.256 Having already discussed some of the ways in which doctrinal 
argument may be subdivided into logical, ethical, and pathetic modes, I 
devote little time here to further elaboration.257 It is useful, however, to 
show some of the common forms of doctrinal rhetoric beyond the Roe and 
Dred Scott examples. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in the Health Care Cases provides a 
ready example of logical doctrinal argument.258 The opinion of the Chief 
Justice and the joint dissent in the case both argued that Congress lacks 
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate “inactivity.”259 The 
opinions variously offered textual, historical, structural, and prudential 
arguments for that view, but they also proposed a simple doctrinal 
justification: “As expansive as our cases construing the scope of the com-
merce power have been, they all have one thing in common: They 
uniformly describe the power as reaching ‘activity.’ It is nearly impossible 
to avoid the word when quoting them.”260 It is quite true that the regnant 
formulation of the scope of congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause at the time of the Health Care Cases permitted Congress to regulate 
“activities,”261 and so it is perfectly logical to conclude, inductively, that 
Congress may not regulate inactivity. A dissenter from this view would 
argue that the Court’s references to “activities” in previous formulations 
followed from the fact that activity, and not inactivity, was at issue in those 
cases. But without reference to some additional, nondoctrinal argument, 
                                                 
254. Id. (citing Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations bk. II, ch. VII, § 94, at 309 (Béla 
Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758)). 
255. Id. at 2511–13. 
256. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 15, at 17–18 (“[W]hen we 
say that a neutral, general principle derived from the caselaw construing the Constitution 
should apply, does not apply or may apply, we make an appeal in a doctrinal mode.”); Fallon, 
Constructivist Coherence, supra note 14, at 1202 (“Constitutional disputes frequently 
abound with analysis of the meanings of judicial precedents.”). 
257. See supra text accompanying notes 170–178. 
258. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
259. Id. at 2587–89 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2649–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by 
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.). 
260. Id. at 2587 (Roberts, C.J.). 
261. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (“Congress’ 
commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial 
relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce.” (citations omitted)).  
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that response is not sufficient to decide that Congress may regulate 
inactivity under the Commerce Clause. 
Ethical and pathetic doctrinalism both recur around the Court’s use of 
one of its most powerful and common rhetorical devices: reference to 
anticanonical cases. Anticanonical cases are those cited as examples of 
constitutional law gone awry. Dred Scott,262 Plessy v. Ferguson,263 Lochner 
v. New York,264 and Korematsu v. United States265 are frequently cited in 
U.S. courts, but almost never in ways meant to signal agreement with their 
underlying reasoning or conclusions.266 These cases often serve as 
doctrinal stand-ins for deep ethical propositions. Thus, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist framed his opposition to heightened scrutiny for commercial 
speech by likening it to the Lochner era, “in which it was common practice 
for this Court to strike down economic regulations adopted by a State 
based on the Court’s own notions of the most appropriate means for the 
State to implement its considered policies.”267 The three most prominent 
members of the anticanon—Dred Scott, Lochner, and Plessy—are 
particularly suited to ethical doctrinalism. This is because their 
anticanonicity results in part from their status as symbols of what our 
canonical constitutional moments repudiated: slavery, economic due 
process, and Jim Crow, respectively.268 Citing these cases signals 
opposition to what the nation might have become (or once was), but is not 
now. 
The subject matter of these cases and the practices they blessed—
namely, forms of racial and economic subjugation—lend themselves to 
deployment in pathetic doctrinal argument as well. Justice Scalia’s use of 
Dred Scott in his Casey coda provides one example.269 Justice Thomas’s 
references to Dred Scott and Plessy in his separate opinion in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 provide 
another.270 There, concurring with a Court decision that invalidated race-
                                                 
262. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
263. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
264. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
265. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
266. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 386 (2011) [hereinafter 
Greene, Anticanon] (defining anticanon as “examples of how not to adjudicate constitutional 
cases”). 
267. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 589 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
268. See Greene, Anticanon, supra note 266, at 468 (“Reconstruction is the repudiation 
of Dred Scott, the New Deal era a repudiation of Lochner, and the civil rights revolution a 
repudiation of Plessy.”). 
269. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1001 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (drawing similarity between Casey and Dred Scott 
in intention to call “contending sides of national controversy to end their national division 
by accepting common mandate rooted in the Constitution”). 
270. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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conscious attempts to integrate the public schools of Seattle and Louisville, 
Justice Thomas thus responded to the suggestion that deliberate efforts at 
racial integration may be benign: 
[I]f our history has taught us anything, it has taught us to beware 
of elites bearing racial theories. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford 
(“[T]hey [members of the ‘negro African race’] had no rights 
which the white man was bound to respect”). Can we really be 
sure that the racial theories that motivated Dred Scott and Plessy 
are a relic of the past or that future theories will be nothing but 
beneficent and progressive? That is a gamble I am unwilling to 
take, and it is one the Constitution does not allow.271 
Within our constitutional culture, describing pro-integration school 
officials (not to mention Justice Breyer in dissent) as “elites bearing racial 
theories” akin to those that found favor in Dred Scott and Plessy is an 
epithet meant to provoke shame and wariness, perhaps even enmity. 
Anticanonical cases are distinctive in that they stand simultaneously 
for apparently inconsistent propositions.272 Plessy represents both racial 
formalism and acontextual colorblindness.273 Dred Scott represents both 
excessive positivism and moral activism by judges.274 Lochner represents 
both the improper use of substantive due process and the use of 
substantive due process at all.275 These propositions bear some logical 
tension, but the ethical and pathetic valences of the decisions are less 
particularized and therefore more unitary. 
 5. Consequences. — The category of argument I have labeled 
“consequences” requires explanation and limitation. Arguing in favor of 
some proposition based on consequences is obviously not particular to 
constitutional law.276 It is enlightening to consider argument from 
consequences in light of the Bobbitt archetype with which it is most clearly 
associated: prudential argument. Bobbitt says that prudential argument is 
concerned with the wisdom of permitting a particular exercise of 
government power,277 but his examples suggest that the measure of 
whether the decision was wise or unwise is the institutional standing of 
the judiciary or the degree to which representative institutions are 
                                                 
271. Id. at 780–82 (Thomas, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
272. See Greene, Anticanon, supra note 266, at 460–61 (“[A]rguments against these 
cases span the ideological spectrum.”). 
273. Id. at 460. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. 
276. See Daniel A. Farber, Book Review, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 1328, 1329 (1983) (reviewing 
Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2) (disputing prudentialism as distinctively legal 
convention).  
277. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 15, at 16–17 (describing 
prudential argument as introduction of “practical effects of constitutional doctrine into the 
rationales underpinning doctrine”). 
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permitted to function effectively.278 Prudential or consequentialist 
argument thus understood speaks to a certain judicial pragmatism that 
recognizes that securing the rule of law over time requires the exercise of 
practical wisdom.279 Judges must attend to the “political and economic 
circumstances surrounding [a] decision.”280 
The general approach sketched in this Part should by now be clear 
enough to proceed quickly through the examples of logical, ethical, and 
pathetic prudential argument. The political question doctrine, whereby 
federal courts refuse to entertain particular questions otherwise within 
their jurisdiction in deference to other branches, typifies prudential 
argument. The first of the factors listed in Baker v. Carr as defining a 
political question is the doctrine’s logical prototype: “a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department.”281 Under this prong, it is to the institutional benefit 
of the judiciary to avoid wading into matters that are textually—and 
therefore transparently—committed to the other branches of government. 
If prudentialism can be said to have a logic, it is that the judicial 
department should mind its own business. 
We see ethical prudential argument in those cases, among others, 
suggesting that judges should stay their hand where doing otherwise 
would cause injury to some distinctively American institution. Consider, 
for example, Justice Powell’s argument for the Court in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, in which he refused to apply 
heightened scrutiny to legally abetted intrastate but interdistrict wealth 
disparities in primary and secondary school public education because 
judicial oversight would threaten local control of schools.282 As Powell 
wrote, augmenting his ethical claim by reference to an iconic judicial 
figure, “Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as one of the peculiar strengths of 
our form of government each State’s freedom to ‘serve as a laboratory; and 
try novel social and economic experiments.’”283 
For pathetic prudentialism we may look to the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Scalia in Boumediene v. Bush.284 The Boumediene Court held that 
Congress could not withhold the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 
from enemy combatants held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.285 Justice Scalia 
noted that the Administration chose the naval detention facility at 
Guantánamo Bay in reliance on prior precedent suggesting that federal 
                                                 
278. See generally Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty (2005) (defending view of 
constitutional interpretation privileging democratic participation). 
279. See Bickel, supra note 106, at 128 (recognizing value of judicial restraint in 
political democracy). 
280. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 61. 
281. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
282. 411 U.S. 1, 49–51 (1973). 
283. Id. at 50. 
284. 553 U.S. 723, 826 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
285. Id. at 771 (majority opinion). 
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courts lacked habeas jurisdiction over foreign territory.286 His most 
memorable line was both prudential and pathetic. After reminding the 
reader that “America is at war with radical Islamists” and consistently 
referring to the terrorist network against whom that war was waged as 
“the enemy,” Justice Scalia writes: 
The game of bait-and-switch that today’s opinion plays upon 
the Nation’s Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us. 
It will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed. That 
consequence would be tolerable if necessary to preserve a time-
honored legal principle vital to our constitutional Republic. But it 
is this Court’s blatant abandonment of such a principle that 
produces the decision today.287 
The opinion situates the Court’s actions in opposition not to “the 
President” but to the “Commander in Chief” in a time of war. It is thus 
prudential. It then claims that the Court has made the war “harder on us,” 
placing the Court and his readership under the umbrella of the military’s 
protection.288 The coup de grace, of course, is that the majority’s decision 
“will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.”289 Blood is on 
Justice Kennedy’s hands: He should be ashamed of himself. 
 6. Ethos. — The table below summarizes the discussion in this Part so 
far. In the left-hand column are five established modalities of 
constitutional argument. The row of headers lists the three standard 
modes of persuasion. Many of the examples discussed above are 
represented in the resulting cross-tabulations. 
 
 TABLE 1: MODALITIES OF ARGUMENT AND MODES OF PERSUASION 
 
 Logos Ethos Pathos 
Text Intratextualism 
McCulloch 
definition of 
“necessary” 
Scalia dissent in 
Casey 
History 
Original-meaning 
originalism 
Original-intent 
originalism 
Rehnquist dissent 
in Texas v. Johnson 
Structure INS v. Chadha Bolling v. Sharpe 
Scalia dissent in 
Arizona v. United 
States 
                                                 
286. Id. at 828 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
287. Id. at 827–28. 
288. Id. at 828 (emphasis added). 
289. Id. at 828. 
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Doctrine 
Activity/inactivity 
distinction 
Anticanon 
Thomas 
concurrence in 
Parents Involved 
Consequences 
Political question 
doctrine: textual 
commitment 
Local control of 
schools in 
Rodriguez 
Scalia dissent in 
Boumediene 
 
Bobbitt identified and devoted much of Constitutional Fate to 
elaboration of ethical argument as a sixth, distinct modality.290 On this 
view, “ethos” should more appropriately be listed in the left-hand column 
rather than the top row of Table 1. But remaining faithful to the 
Aristotelian conception of ethos as parallel to rather than modified by 
logos and pathos has some advantages over Bobbitt’s approach. Most 
significantly, it substantially mitigates—or, better, explains—what 
Gudridge has called the “scattershot” quality of Bobbitt’s examples of 
ethical argument. 291 
The metes and bounds of the category have long been obscure, even 
on Bobbitt’s terms. Bobbitt has argued, for example, that the only 
American ethos reflected in the Constitution is the ethos of limited 
government.292 Although ethical argument itself is by now a well-accepted 
form, I am aware of no scholar besides Bobbitt who accepts this curious 
limitation,293 and Bobbitt’s own application of it is not transparent. For 
example, as Daniel Farber notes, Bobbitt appears to include fairness to 
Indians as reflecting the American ethos294 when “it is painfully obvious 
that virtually nothing is as American as stealing land from Indians.”295 
Apart from that fact, it is not clear how that ethic relates to limited 
government; one can easily imagine ways in which either fairness or 
unfairness to Indians is compelled by some conception of limited 
government. “The persuasiveness of Bobbitt’s ethical arguments . . . 
depends in part on the predisposition of their recipients to see the 
analogies [he makes] in Bobbitt’s way,” Gudridge writes.296 It is for like 
                                                 
290. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 93–177. 
291. Gudridge, supra note 165, at 1975. 
292. Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 15, at 21. Bobbitt appears to 
mean that the only justifiable ethical argument is one that draws on a principle of limited 
government, but it is difficult to say why this is so or indeed how it meaningfully constrains 
the category. See also Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 144–46 (discussing 
general limitations of federal government as being crux of ethical modality). 
293. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Justification in Constitutional Adjudication: A Comment 
on Constitutional Interpretation, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1707, 1716 (2004) [hereinafter Tushnet, 
Justification] (noting criticism of Bobbitt’s conception of ethical arguments). 
294. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 115–18 (discussing Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)). 
295. Farber, supra note 276, at 1332. 
296. Gudridge, supra note 165, at 1976. 
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reasons that Bobbitt’s treatment of this category has been called 
“idiosyncratic,”297 “misleading,”298 and “seriously flawed.”299 
Three examples from Constitutional Fate show how understanding 
ethical argument as a mode of persuasion makes better sense of this 
important category. In the Pentagon Papers Case, the Supreme Court 
refused, on First Amendment grounds, to permit the President to enjoin 
the publication of classified information relating to the origins and conduct 
of the Vietnam War.300 This result is difficult to justify textually, since the 
First Amendment does not by its terms apply to the President (or, for that 
matter, to the judiciary), but Bobbitt explains the case as an application of 
ethical argument: “It would be intolerable if a President could use means 
to restrict a free press that Congress plainly could not . . . [b]ecause it 
would be inconsistent with the ethic expressed by the First 
Amendment.”301 
The second example comes from Trop v. Dulles, in which the Court 
held that the government could not revoke citizenship as punishment for 
wartime desertion.302 The plurality opinion of Chief Justice Warren 
formally justified the outcome in Eighth Amendment terms: Making 
someone stateless is an unusual form of punishment and imposes a 
significant disability, rendering “[h]is very existence . . . at the sufferance of 
the country in which he happens to find himself.”303 Reformulating Trop in 
what he describes as ethical terms, Bobbitt writes that the decision better 
rests on the principle that “representative government, created by the 
People acting as a whole, could not begin slicing off parts of the Polity 
without the consent of the People.”304 
The final example is Moore v. City of East Cleveland, which invalidated 
a municipal law that prohibited extended family members from living 
together in a single housing unit.305 Bobbitt characterizes as ethical the 
substantive due process basis for Justice Powell’s plurality opinion, that 
“‘the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.’”306  
The relevant ethical claims in the three opinions just discussed are the 
application of free speech and press guarantees to the Executive; the 
incapacity of a representative government to deconstruct its polity; and 
                                                 
297. Tushnet, Justification, supra note 293, at 1716. 
298. Farber, supra note 276, at 1332. 
299. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and Constitutional Ethics, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 665, 
671 (1984) (reviewing Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2). 
300. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
301. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 101–02. 
302. 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
303. Id. at 101. 
304. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 104. 
305. 431 U.S. 494, 499–506 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
306. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 2, at 96 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 
503 (1977)). 
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the sanctity of the family. What binds these claims? Protection for each of 
these values can be rooted in a norm of limited government, but that is 
true of virtually any value derived from a case the government loses.  
In fact, the points Bobbitt wishes to make in citing these cases do not 
require him to articulate a sixth modality. Each fits into a more 
conventional modality—just not necessarily the logical mode of that 
modality. Thus, the argument that “Congress” as used in the First 
Amendment is not literal is a textual argument; advancing the argument by 
asserting the intolerability of the alternative within the American system 
is ethical in its rhetoric. The notion that revoking citizenship without 
consent is incompatible with representative government falls into the 
heartland of a structural argument: It is easy to visualize Charles Black 
making precisely the same moves. Again, the ipse dixit character of the 
argumentation suggests an ethical cast. Finally, the idea that our history 
and tradition protect the liberty to define one’s own family is clearly an 
historical argument, though as with many historical arguments grounded 
in ongoing traditions, it is in the ethical mode.307 What unites these cases 
is less a subject of argument like the other modalities and more a mode of 
persuasion with respect to distinct subjects.308 
This Part has demonstrated that pathetic argument is a form of 
persuasion in parallel to logical and ethical argument that may apply to 
each of the traditional subjects of constitutional argument: text, history, 
structure, doctrine, and consequences. This Part has not demonstrated, 
nor sought to demonstrate, that pathetic argument is an appropriate 
method of persuasion in any particular case or set of cases, nor has it 
sought to compare it normatively with logical or ethical argument. The 
next Part addresses these questions. 
Significantly, this Part also has not suggested that pathetic forms of 
rhetoric are used—or are appropriate—only in relation to some 
identifiable and accepted subject of argument. Drawing direct connections 
between rhetorical modes and subjects of constitutional argument is 
useful in situating this Article’s claims within the existing literature, and 
may well have normative import,309 but plainly there are instances in 
which pathetic argument has been used primarily to persuade the reader 
as to the ultimate adjudicative outcome, unmediated by legal niceties. 
Gutwrenching statements of the facts in cases involving criminal 
                                                 
307. See supra text accompanying notes 209–215 (noting ethical elements of historical 
arguments). 
308. Describing ethical, logical, and pathetic argument as modes of persuasion 
arguably aligns them with Bobbitt’s definition of his interesting term “modalities”: “the ways 
in which legal propositions are characterized as true.” Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, 
supra note 15, at 12. Bobbitt’s particular interest in ethical argument, which is the closest of 
his list to being a modality in precisely this sense, may bear responsibility for his 
formulation. 
309. See infra Part III.C.4 (criticizing use of pathetic arguments without connection to 
“usual constitutional forms”). 
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procedural rights provide a ready example.310 “Poor Joshua!” may provide 
another.311 As the next Part discusses, if this kind of unmediated appeal to 
emotion is the main target of critics of pathetic argument, then those 
critics need to say more about whether and to what degree the mediated 
appeals discussed in this Part should be permitted. 
 III. THE POSSIBILITIES OF PATHOS 
Is pathetic argument becoming of a constitutional judge? This Part 
defends the view that it is at least sometimes appropriate for judges in 
constitutional cases to seek to persuade the reader of some legal 
proposition by way of an emotional appeal. This view does not depend on 
the claim, discussed in Part II.A and below, that emotions always or often 
embody intelligent judgments. Even if we adopt the minority position of 
the feeling theorists, the place of pathetic argument as an established 
element of constitutional practice and its relevance to legal persuasion 
would support, if not always compel, its validity. That said, the insights of 
cognitive theorists as to the structure of emotions and their relation to 
judgment may nonetheless be relevant to assessing the particular 
circumstances under which pathetic argument is appropriate and the 
frequency with which such circumstances obtain.  
Part III.A summarizes the views of cognitive theorists as relevant to 
the normative case for emotional appeal in judicial opinion-writing. Part 
III.B then makes that normative case. This Article argues that emotional 
appeals by constitutional judges are partly constitutive of constitutional 
practice, are democratically desirable in some circumstances, may 
improve the administrability of constitutional rules, and are inevitable. 
Part III.C discusses a set of interrelated and overlapping considerations 
that, taken together, inform whether and to what degree pathetic 
argument is proper within our system. These considerations include 
whether the opinion is a separate writing or for the court, whether the 
court itself is acting in a “law-announcing” capacity, the nature of the 
                                                 
310. See, e.g., Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 224–25 (1994) (recounting details of 
Schiro’s conviction for murder of Laura Luebbehusen; Schiro hit Luebbehusen on head 
repeatedly with glass liquor bottle and iron and raped her repeatedly before and after her 
death). 
311. A parallel to the “Poor Joshua!” dissent may be found in Justice Scalia’s dissenting 
opinion in Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391–96 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting), which 
held that a criminal defendant may claim ineffective assistance of counsel based on poor 
legal advice resulting in rejection of a plea bargain offer and conviction after a full and fair 
trial. Id. at 1388 (majority opinion). Justice Scalia ends his dissent by personalizing the 
respondent’s victim: “Released felon Anthony Cooper, who shot repeatedly and gravely 
injured a woman named Kali Mundy, was tried and convicted for his crimes by a jury of his 
peers, and given a punishment that Michigan’s elected representatives have deemed 
appropriate. Nothing about that result is unfair or unconstitutional.” Id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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particular emotion involved, and whether the emotional appeal is directed 
at persuasion as to an established subject of argument. 
 A. The Good of Emotions 
It will be difficult to arrive at a normative judgment about appeals to 
emotion without first deciding what emotions are good for. Part II.A 
discussed a range of views as to what constitutes emotion and 
characterized the “cognitive” view as the belief that emotions are, in 
important respects, subjective judgments attached to some intentional 
object. If emotions operate in parallel to other cognitive processes that 
help us to evaluate and to assess propositions about our environment, 
then it may well shift the burden to those who would claim that pathetic 
argument is never an appropriate rhetorical strategy for a constitutional 
judge. It is beyond this Article’s scope to defend the cognitive view in full, 
but it is worth exploring how much accepting this view would help to 
answer the normative question that sits at the heart of this Part. 
A simple example from the law of evidence is instructive. Under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, and in most state courts, an “excited utterance” 
is an exception to the general prohibition on hearsay.312 The Federal Rules 
define an excited utterance as “[a] statement relating to a startling event or 
condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement 
that it caused.”313 The idea is that a spontaneous statement made within 
the anxiety or excitement of the moment, before any opportunity for 
reflection, is less likely to have been fabricated.314 The exception is 
therefore consistent with a common Freudian intuition that raw emotions 
can reveal our true views about the world, and, conversely, that logical 
reasoning can abide manipulation and obfuscation.315 At the same time, 
criticism of the excited utterance exception foregrounds the complexity of 
the relationship between emotions and truth claims.316 Excited utterances 
are considered reliable because they more or less accurately report the 
                                                 
312. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 n.8 (1992) 
(declaring excited utterance exception to be “firmly rooted” and recognized in “nearly four-
fifths” of states). Under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and its progeny, excited 
utterances may be introduced as hearsay in a criminal case if—as will often be the case—
they were made in the course of an “ongoing emergency.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 
826–28 (2006); see also Andrew Dylan, Note, Working Through the Confrontation Clause 
After Davis v. Washington, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1905, 1932 (2007) (“Davis’s ongoing 
emergency test tends to flatten the distinction between confrontation analysis and hearsay 
analysis under the excited utterance exception.”). 
313. Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). 
314. 6 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1747, at 195 (James 
H. Chadbourn ed., 1976) (explaining traditional rationale for spontaneous exclamation 
exception). 
315. See Maroney, supra note 4, at 643 (discussing excited utterance exception). 
316. See Aviva Orenstein, “My God!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance 
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 159, 178–83 (1997) (presenting 
psychological critique of excited utterance exception). 
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speaker’s perceptions, not because they nudge those perceptions any 
closer to reality. Judgments made in haste or in moments of stress, shock, 
or euphoria may be less likely to be deliberately mendacious, but they may 
be more susceptible to cognitive breakdowns that impair perception.317  
Cognitivists have lent both theoretical and empirical support for the 
view that emotions function in just the way the excited utterance 
exception contemplates. Dan Kahan describes three different models of 
how emotions function in risk perception,318 which is crucial to forming 
judgments about legal rules. On one model, the “rational weigher theory,” 
emotions are the psycho-physical expression of risk perceptions arrived at 
through a rational balancing of costs and benefits.319 On a competing 
model, the “irrational weigher theory,” emotions act as heuristics to 
compensate for our inability to rationally assess costs and benefits. As 
crude substitutes for balanced assessments, they systematically impair our 
judgments and lead to identifiable biases in our perception of risk.320 On a 
third model, the “cultural evaluator theory,” rather than helping us to 
maximize our welfare in a narrow sense, emotion helps to align our 
judgments with the social meaning of particular activities.321 An 
individual’s aim on this view is to make judgments consistent with a world 
that expresses her core beliefs. Emotions are an important conduit 
between those core beliefs and states of affairs that conform to or resist 
them.  
There is considerable evidence that emotion indeed precedes and 
motivates assessments of value. It has been observed, for example, that 
individual perceptions of risk tend to vary inversely with individual 
perceptions of benefit.322 This negative correlation requires explanation, 
since risk bears no necessary relationship to benefit (and to the degree 
that it is related, we might expect the relationship to be positive). One 
plausible explanation is that our initial reaction to some propositions is an 
affective reaction that jointly informs our assessment of risks and 
benefits.323 Consistent with this hypothesis, a 1994 study by Ali Alhakami 
and Paul Slovic found that the quantified intensity of individuals’ affective 
evaluations of particular phenomena, such as nuclear power or bicycles, 
                                                 
317. See id. at 181 (“[B]ut the very stress that makes them so honest can also interfere 
with their ability to perceive, transcribe, and remember events.”).  
318. Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
741, 744–52 (2008). 
319. Id. at 745–46. 
320. Id. at 746–48. 
321. Id. at 748–49. 
322. See Ali Siddiq Alhakami & Paul Slovic, A Psychological Study of the Inverse 
Relationship Between Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit, 14 Risk Analysis 1085, 1085 
(1994) (presenting studies depicting inverse relationship between risk perception and 
benefit perception). 
323. See id. (“We find that the inverse relationship is . . . indicative of a confounding of 
risk and benefit in people’s minds.”). 
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were strong predictors of the degree of negative correlation between 
perceived risk and perceived benefit.324 That is, strongly held feelings 
about an object or activity led people to judge the object or activity as 
either high risk and low benefit (with unfavorable attitudes as the 
independent variable) or low risk and high benefit (with favorable 
attitudes as the independent variable).325 Additional experimental 
research has found that time pressure, which tends to diminish the 
opportunity for nonaffective forms of cognition, increases the magnitude 
of the negative correlation between risk and benefit.326 This and similar 
studies have led many researchers to conclude that affect “comes prior to, 
and directs, judgments of risk and benefit.”327 
Emotions help us connect our external environment to our values. 
Nussbaum uses a helpful example that originates with the neuroscientist 
Antonio Damasio.328 “Elliot” was a man in his thirties with damage to his 
prefrontal cortex that required surgery.329 Elliot had no difficulty 
performing a very wide range of cognitive tasks, such as remembering 
dates, names, and other details of his personal and professional life as well 
as being capable of high-level discussion of macro issues such as politics 
and the economy.330 But he lost all sense of responsibility. He could not 
motivate himself to get up in the morning, he could not be trusted to 
manage his tasks at work, his attention span was sporadic and 
unpredictable, and his judgment of character seemed to suffer.331 Elliot 
was intelligent and otherwise healthy but, Damasio writes, he was “unable 
to reason and decide in ways conducive to the maintenance and 
betterment of himself and his family, no longer capable of succeeding as an 
independent being.”332  
Follow-up revealed that Elliot had another problem: He could not 
emote. With an unusually acute memory for detail, he related tragic 
personal events with complete detachment.333 Topics of conversation that 
had once affected him deeply no longer caused any emotional reaction in 
                                                 
324. See id. at 1095 (“A person’s general affective evaluation of the item was the major 
predictor of the risk/benefit correlation.”). 
325. Id. 
326. See Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risk and 
Benefits, 13 J. Behav. Decision Making 1, 6–7 (2000); cf. Richard S. Lazarus, Emotion and 
Adaptation 131 (1991) (presenting data establishing increased negative correlation 
between risk and benefit). 
327. Finucane, supra note 326, at 3. 
328. Nussbaum, Upheavals, supra note 11, at 116 (discussing Damasio’s patient 
“Elliot”); see also Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human 
Brain 36–37 (1994) (introducing patient with damage to prefrontal cortex). 
329. Damasio, supra note 328, at 34–35. 
330. Id. at 35. 
331. Id. at 36–37. 
332. Id. at 38. 
333. Id. at 44–45. 
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any direction.334 Additional study of other patients with prefrontal 
damage similar to Elliot’s found each of them to have both defective 
decisionmaking ability and “flat” emotion.335 These cases then led to 
further research that revealed multiple sections of the brain the 
impairment of which simultaneously hinders “goal-oriented thinking” and 
“emotion and feeling.”336 These findings lend significant plausibility to 
Nussbaum’s conclusion, drawing on the work of Damasio and others, that 
“emotions provide the animal (in this case human) with a sense of how the 
world relates to its own set of goals and projects.”337 
Maroney usefully summarizes the ascendant cognitivist conclusions 
as to the utility of emotions.338 She writes that emotion “reveals reasons, 
motivates action in service of reasons, enables reason, and is educable.”339 
Emotions are evaluative, in some way, and reflect beliefs that are not just 
ministerial reactions to stimuli but can be normatively evaluated, can be 
taught,340 and should be judged rational or irrational piecemeal rather 
than on the whole. But emotions enable particular kinds of evaluations: 
They are assessments of value, and therefore motivate judgment, 
prioritization, and consequently action in a way that, as poor Elliot 
teaches, nonaffective cognition cannot.341 
 B. The Good of Pathetic Argument 
Who is a constitutional judge’s ideal reader?342 Surely it is not Elliot, 
but why not? Answering this question seems to require a theory of what 
constitutional law is and what it aspires to be. The excited utterance 
example suggested that the reliability of an emotion-laden judgment 
depends on the nature of the claim under evaluation. Emotion may enable 
that judgment to better resonate with our core values even as it biases our 
evaluation of historical or empirical facts. The intelligence of an emotional 
judgment, in other words, depends on what the decider’s ends are. But to 
                                                 
334. Id. at 45. 
335. See id. at 54–58 (discussing historical cases from 1932, 1940, and 1948 of 
patients exhibiting symptoms similar to those of Elliot). 
336. See id. at 70 (“[T]here appears to be a collection of systems in the human brain 
consistently dedicated to the goal-oriented thinking process we call reasoning, and . . . also 
involved in emotion and feeling . . . .”). 
337. Nussbaum, Upheavals, supra note 11, at 117. 
338. See Maroney, supra note 4, at 642–51 (discussing roles of emotion and reason in 
law). 
339. Id. at 642. 
340. See id. at 648 n.96 (citing James J. Gross & Ross A. Thompson, Emotional 
Regulation: Conceptual Foundations in Handbook of Emotional Regulation 3, 13–15 (James J. 
Gross ed., 2007), as overview of “cognitive change” strategy for altering emotions). 
341. Cf. Hume, supra note 130, at 236 (“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the 
passions . . . .”). 
342. See White, Heracles’ Bow, supra note 12, at 96–99 (exploring interpretation of 
“meaning” based on how document’s ideal reader would understand its bearing on present 
cultural and political circumstances). 
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assume that the object of constitutional judging is to prove some positive 
proposition rather than to align the law with the values of the governed is 
to beg the question. 
This Section offers four normative justifications for the use of pathetic 
argument in constitutional law. These justifications proceed from different 
assumptions about what constitutional law ought to be. All four 
justifications support the view that pathetic argument is not always 
appropriate, but that whether it is or is not better aligns with how 
emotional appeals are made than with whether they are made at all. 
 1. Pathetic Argument as Conventional. — Pathetic argument may be 
appropriate to the degree that it constitutes a standard move in 
constitutional law. Constitutional law, like politics, is beset with 
reasonable disagreement over the outcomes it supports.343 In deciding 
whether some approach to constitutional law is appropriate, it will not 
generally be helpful to assess the results that approach produces, since 
doing so simply reproduces intractable disagreement.344 The more useful 
way to evaluate a constitutional method is by reference to its consistency 
with accepted practices of constitutional decisionmaking.345 An approach 
is properly “constitutional” if it fits the usual grammar of constitutional 
law.346 Part II.B showed that this was true with respect to at least some 
forms of pathetic argument at least some of the time. 
Concededly, the notion that pathetic argument is appropriate because 
it is used has a certain just-so quality. Note, however, that all of the 
pathetic examples from Part II.B are from cases decided in the last three 
decades. This is not to say that pathetic argument was never used before 
then, but it does suggest the possibility that the pathetic mode was less 
common before the advent of modern substantive due process and before 
the rise of legal realism.347 Substantive due process has invited 
                                                 
343. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 
1346, 1366–69 (2006) (arguing consensus about constitutionally protected rights is not 
exempt from general disagreement about major political issues). 
344. Looking to results may be helpful on the margins, as for example when some 
approach calls into question the validity of canonical cases or the invalidity of anticanonical 
ones. See Cass R. Sunstein, In Defense of Liberal Education, 43 J. Legal Educ. 22, 26 (1993) 
(“[A]n approach to constitutional interpretation is unacceptable if it entails the 
incorrectness of Brown v. Board of Education.”). 
345. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on 
Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 570, 582–84 (2001) (arguing extent to which 
practice is embedded provides support for its constitutionality). 
346. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1771, 
1775 (1994) (discussing importance of “law talk” in legitimate constitutional arguments); 
James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal 
Life, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 689 (1985) (suggesting law be defined as “particular set of 
resources made available by a culture for speech and argument”). 
347. See generally Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in 
Supreme Court Opinions, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 193 (2002) (cataloguing differences in 
rhetoric between Stone and Rehnquist Courts). 
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constitutional judges to inquire into, variously, values “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty,”348 “principle[s] of justice so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental,”349 and choices that enable one to “define one’s own concept 
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life.”350 Legal realism dispelled the notion that law, and especially 
constitutional law, could be reduced to a mechanistic formula insensitive 
to the biases and predilections of the decider. Established modalities of 
argument rise and fall in prominence in ways that feed back into the 
degree to which their use is acceptable. Imagine, if you can, District of 
Columbia v. Heller351 being written in 1978 instead of 2008. Mainstream 
constitutional thinkers would instinctively have coded both its pro-gun 
result and its unapologetically originalist methodology—the myopic focus 
on history as a subject of constitutional discourse—as wrong.352 Things 
change. There is no reason to believe that modes of constitutional 
persuasion are any less susceptible to these dynamics than subjects of 
constitutional argument. 
 2. Pathetic Argument as Democratic. — Pathetic argument is valuable 
because of its power to persuade. In politics, we expect leaders to 
persuade the electorate that the policies they are pursuing are in line with 
the polity’s values. If emotion is necessary to forming those kinds of 
judgments, as evidence suggests,353 then pathetic argument is both 
desirable and essential to politics.354 Constitutional law aspires to be 
different from politics—or at least to be different from electoral politics—
but we must ask whether the dimension of difference either requires or 
suggests a different attitude toward appeals to emotion.355 
Imagine you get a speeding ticket—eighty miles per hour in a sixty-
five mile per hour zone—and are required to appear before a judge. You 
plead guilty and the judge requires you to pay a fine. Before letting you go, 
                                                 
348. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 
395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
349. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), overruled in part by Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
350. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
351. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
352. See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in 
Heller, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 191, 223–24 (2008) (discussing skeptical view of individual rights-
based Second Amendment arguments in 1980s). 
353. See supra Part III.A (summarizing views of cognitive theorists with respect to 
relationship between emotions and assessments of value). 
354. See Drew Westen, The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of 
the Nation 55–57 (2008) (discussing role of emotional reactions in politics); see also Dan T. 
Coenen, The Story of The Federalist: How Hamilton and Madison Reconceived America 47–
50 (2007) (cataloguing appeals to emotion appearing in The Federalist Papers). 
355. See Maroney, supra note 4, at 636 (remarking, in Enlightenment thinking, “[s]ome 
quantum of emotion . . . was to be expected from legislative and executive officials” but not 
judges). 
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the judge chastises you in open court for engaging in dangerous behavior. 
He points to your young son playing with a toy truck in the back of the 
courtroom and says, “Some little boy just like him is alive today only 
because you were lucky enough not to blow out a tire at the wrong time.” 
The judge has made a pathetic appeal for you not to drive so fast. He 
assumes that you value the life of your child and he believes that your 
experience of shame, guilt, or sadness will help to connect your behavior 
to your values. The feelings the judge seeks to invoke may well perform 
that function much better than a monetary fine. But that kind of appeal 
would feel out of place in a judicial opinion. The appeal is for your ears—
only in part because we recognize the subjectivity of emotion. We all have 
different values, as much as we all have different personal memories, 
experiences, and perceptive capacities. That our emotional response to 
some object can be expected to differ from our neighbor’s is part of what 
constitutes the response as an emotion rather than some other cognitive 
process.356 Pathetic arguments are, in Bobbitt’s phrase, “idiosyncratic” 
because emotions are themselves idiosyncratic. 
But constitutional law is not like traffic tickets. The speed limit is 
verifiable and typically transparent, its status as a governing rule is not 
usually questioned, and whether a driver has surpassed it is a question of 
physics rather than metaphysics. Constitutional law (in hard cases, at 
least)357 requires a judge to persuade a reader that conduct that some 
political actor often believed efficacious and legal violated (or did not 
violate) a rule or (more often) standard or principle whose authority 
derives from some combination of inertia, general acceptance by the 
American people, historical provenance, or social desirability. And so the 
feat of persuasion is not simply to have the reader internalize the social 
policy embedded in an agreed-upon rule; it is to have the reader accept the 
applicability and authority of the rule itself.358 This task is not only more 
difficult but it is necessarily “idiosyncratic.” In the absence of any accepted 
metarule that prioritizes different sources of constitutional meaning,359 
the practice of constitutional law is the practice of persuading diverse 
citizens to share the priorities of the adjudicator.360 To the degree that 
                                                 
356. See Nussbaum, Upheavals, supra note 11, at 27–28 (discussing subjective nature 
of perception and emotional responses). 
357. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 749, 764–73 (2013) 
(arguing legal realist challenge extends to cases appearing easy on basis of formal legal 
materials). 
358. Cf. Robert A. Ferguson, Judicial Rhetoric and Ulysses in Government Hands, 15 
Rhetoric & Pub. Aff. 435, 439 (2012) [hereinafter Ferguson, Judicial Rhetoric] (“[T]he more 
controversial the decision, and the more uncertain the consequences, the greater the need 
for [judicial] commentary that reaches outward while answering an inward matter.”). 
359. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 15, at 155–62 (discussing 
lack of usefulness of such metarule if one did exist). 
360. Among the diverse citizens, of course, are the parties before the court. See 
Ferguson, Judicial Rhetoric, supra note 358, at 437 (“The need for persuasion is more 
intense in a judicial opinion [than in ordinary discourse], because the multiple ‘hearer’ in 
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emotions are vital to one’s capacity to set priorities in light of one’s values, 
emotional appeals must form part of constitutional practice. 
This justification for pathetic argument is ultimately democratic. 
Persuading the audience that an argument is properly constitutional 
requires the judge to persuade the audience that it is consistent with or 
compelled by their values. Failing to do so does not necessarily deprive the 
rule the argument supports of the force of law (hence the 
countermajoritarian difficulty) but it may deprive it of democratic 
justification. Alexander Bickel may have put the point best, if unwittingly. 
Bickel emphasized that the countermajoritarian difficulty is misleading if 
we understand judges to be custodians of our long-term values: 
[M]any actions of government have two aspects: their immediate, 
necessarily intended, practical effects, and their perhaps 
unintended or unappreciated bearing on values we hold to have 
more general and permanent interest. . . . [W]hen the pressure 
for immediate results is strong enough and emotions ride high 
enough, [legislators] will ordinarily prefer to act on expediency 
rather than take the long view. . . . Judges have, or should have, 
the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of 
the scholar in pursuing the ends of government. This is crucial in 
sorting out the enduring values of a society . . . . [Courts can] 
appeal to men’s better natures, to call forth their aspirations . . . 
.361 
This reads like a brief for the position that judges should avoid emotional 
appeal, until we remember Elliot. Emotional impairment seemed to 
prevent Elliot from connecting his everyday judgments to his aspirations. 
Stephen Holmes writes, echoing Bickel, that “[a] constitution is Peter sober 
while the electorate is Peter drunk,”362 but Damasio’s description of Elliot 
calls to mind a different but equally resonant sort of inebriate—listless, 
distracted, unable to rouse himself to action. The revolution must be equal 
parts Enjolras and Combeferre,363 as moved by passion as grounded in 
reason.364 
                                                                                                                 
court is formally divided with at least one reluctant auditor and probably more in the 
disappointed party.”). 
361. Bickel, supra note 106, at 24–26. 
362. Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy 
135 (1995). 
363. Victor Hugo writes that Enjolras “was subject to unexpected outbursts of soul,” 
whereas Combeferre preferred “to bring the human race into accord with its destiny 
gradually, by means of education, the inculcation of axioms, the promulgation of positive 
laws; and, between two lights, his preference was rather for illumination than for 
conflagration.” 3 Victor Hugo, Les Misérables bk. 4, at 68–69 (Isabel F. Hapgood trans., New 
York, Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1887) (1862). 
364. See Abrams, Emotions, supra note 66, at 570–71 (“[T]he mobilization of rights is 
informed and infused by varied forms of affect . . . .”). This capacity can be pernicious, and 
not just in the obvious ways that revolutionary France calls to mind. See infra Part IV.B 
(recognizing potential for appeals to emotion to stoke regressive forms of populism). It may 
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Pathetic argument may have still greater democratic justification 
insofar as we understand constitutional law in expressive terms.365 Much 
constitutional doctrine derives from the social meaning of particular 
governmental practices, such as racial discrimination or religious 
endorsement.366 The Constitution’s text and history may be indeterminate 
as to whether, for example, the Constitution permits racial 
gerrymandering, the specific harm of which is difficult to articulate or 
measure,367 but Shaw v. Reno368 and its progeny recognize that racial 
gerrymanders that create bizarrely shaped districts upset expectations 
about political community in the name of a single value—race—whose 
relationship to representative politics is itself contested and complex.369 
Certain kinds of violations are of the “we know it when we see it” sort 
precisely because law interacts with social reality in a way that is 
impossible either to quantify or to ignore. The judgment that certain 
practices are unconstitutional is not intelligible unless the adjudicator 
appreciates the values the practice communicates and ties them to her 
own. Denying the pathetic mode to constitutional judges therefore disables 
them in seeking public approval and understanding of their work. 
It may do even more. This Part has assumed that emotional appeal 
enables persuasion, and that its capacity to do so may recommend it, in 
some cases, whether or not emotion also enables rational judgment in the 
traditional sense. But recall that emotion may also be necessary to basic 
cognition, and so emotional appeal may be necessary to explanation of 
constitutional law. Accepting this claim requires accepting at least some 
cognitivist premises about the basic ontology of emotion, but crucially it 
does not presuppose any indeterminacy in constitutional law. Many 
                                                                                                                 
also undermine the persuasiveness of the opinion if used too clumsily, as perhaps with 
“Poor Joshua!” and with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s flag-burning opinion. 
365. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503, 1504–05, 1531–64 (2000) (arguing “existing 
practices of moral and legal evaluation are best understood through expressivist 
perspectives” and constitutional doctrine is best understood through conceptions of 
expressive dimensions of state action). 
366. See id. at 1532 (noting Equal Protection Clause and Establishment Clause are 
“areas scholars most often point to as best understood in expressivist terms”). 
367. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” 
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L. 
Rev. 483, 499–506 (1993) (contending Shaw teaches modes of constitutional analysis 
extending beyond analysis of policy purpose and effect, and “value reductionism”). 
368. 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (holding unconstitutional instances where newly drawn 
district is “so extremely [geographically] irregular on its face” as to be understood only as 
“effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting”). 
369. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 365, at 1539 (attributing expressive harm of 
racial redistricting to improper association of political identity and race); Pildes & Niemi, 
supra note 367, at 526 (observing Shaw v. Reno illustrates government cannot 
constitutionally redistrict such that race supplants other relevant values). 
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familiar tools of exposition—metaphor,370 personalization of abstract 
concepts,371 slippery slope arguments372—are most powerful when they 
engage the emotions, if only to ensure that a complex or obscure point is 
understood.373 
 3. Pathetic Argument as Administrable. — In December 1997, Shirley 
Ree Smith was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison for 
shaking her seven-week-old grandson too violently while putting him to 
sleep.374 The evidence that the child died of so-called Shaken Baby 
Syndrome rather than Sudden Infant Death Syndrome was heavily 
disputed at trial.375 Her conviction was affirmed on appeal and she failed 
to obtain postconviction relief in state courts.376 A federal district court 
denied her petition for writ of habeas corpus, but the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit reversed and ordered that the writ be granted on the 
basis of insufficient evidence.377 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated and remanded 
without argument for reconsideration in light of Carey v. Musladin.378 
Musladin had to do with neither Shaken Baby Syndrome nor the sufficiency 
of the evidence standard. In Musladin, a panel of the Ninth Circuit had 
reversed a district court’s denial of habeas relief on the issue of whether it 
violated a murder defendant’s fair trial rights to allow members of the 
victim’s family to wear buttons depicting the victim in the front row of the 
gallery.379 What the two cases principally had in common was an alleged 
misapplication by a Ninth Circuit panel of the standard for granting habeas 
relief codified in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.380 
The Ninth Circuit either did not get the message or ignored it. On 
remand, the panel reinstated the grant of habeas relief, concluding that its 
                                                 
370. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560 (1989) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] chill wind blows.”). 
371. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1949–50 (2011) (embedding 
photographs of overcrowded conditions in California prisons in opinion holding 
substandard medical treatment resulting from conditions violated Eighth Amendment). 
372. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) 
(Roberts, C.J.) (arguing government’s position in favor of upholding mandate to purchase 
health insurance would likewise permit mandate to purchase “cars or broccoli”).  
373. If one accepts the claim that emotion invariably influences judicial 
decisionmaking—a premise this Article does not endeavor to defend—then appealing to the 
reader’s emotion might perform an additional democratic service: candor. 
374. Andrew Blankstein, Woman Convicted in Grandson’s Shaking Death, L.A. Times 
(Dec. 9, 1997), http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/09/local/me-62263 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review); see also Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated 
sub nom. Patrick v. Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007). 
375. Smith, 437 F.3d at 886–88. 
376. Id. at 888. 
377. Id. at 890. 
378. Patrick, 550 U.S. 915 (2007); see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006). 
379. See Musladin, 549 U.S. at 73 (discussing procedural history of case). 
380. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). 
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earlier decision was “unaffected by Musladin.”381 The State again 
petitioned for certiorari. Again the Court granted the petition and vacated 
and remanded in light of another case, McDaniel v. Brown,382 in which the 
Ninth Circuit had been reversed on a grant of habeas relief. On remand, the 
panel again reinstated its original opinion, concluding that “nothing in 
Brown is inconsistent with our prior decision or our method of reaching 
it.”383 The State once more petitioned for certiorari, and this time the 
Supreme Court summarily reversed with a written opinion.384  
I recite this sequence to demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s 
audience is not limited to the American people and that other actors 
within the federal system have the capacity to resist the Court’s 
directives.385 The Court sits atop a pyramid of lower federal courts and, 
with respect to issues of federal law, formally controls the decisions of the 
state courts. Supreme Court decisions also must be enforced by executive 
officials, must be followed by administrative agencies in the course of 
rulemaking and enforcement activity, and must be honored by legislative 
drafters across the country. As with any appellate court, the Supreme 
Court’s efforts at persuasion must attend to the many different 
decisionmakers who must implement and negotiate its decisions.386 In a 
setting of radical institutional pluralism, failure to persuade may have 
powerful consequences for the administration of judicial doctrine.387 
                                                 
381. Smith v. Patrick, 508 F.3d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 2007). 
382. 130 S. Ct. 665 (2010). 
383. Smith v. Mitchell, 624 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 2010). 
384. See Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 7–8 (2011) (holding evidence sufficient to 
support finding child died from Shaken Baby Syndrome). California Governor Jerry Brown 
subsequently granted Smith executive clemency. Carol J. Williams, Woman Won’t Be Sent 
Back to Prison, L.A. Times, Apr. 7, 2012, at AA1. 
385. See Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in 
a Complex Adaptive System, 61 Am. U. L. Rev. 457, 459–62, 472–74, 477–81 (2012) 
(discussing how discretionary space in constitutional interpretation allows for “occasional 
departures from the Supreme Court’s desired course of action” by lower courts); Gudridge, 
supra note 165, at 1986–89 (discussing lower courts’ resistance to Supreme Court rulings 
and initiation of development of new areas of constitutional law). See generally Adam 
Shinar, Dissenting from Within: Why and How Public Officials Resist the Law, 40 Fla. St. U. L. 
Rev. 601, 609–11, 630–46 (2013) (describing methods by which public officials may resist 
implementing laws, including defiance, nonacquiescence, bulletproofing, outsourcing, 
prioritization, and interpretation). 
386. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 Va. L. Rev. 
1545, 1561 (1990) (“Like the lawyer-advocate, the judge has a number of audiences she 
must persuade that she is right and that the losing party’s lawyer is wrong. These audiences 
include the appellate courts, the legal community, the losing party . . . , and the public at 
large.”). 
387. See Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of 
Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 Am. 
J. Pol. Sci. 673, 690, 692 (1994) (concluding judges on courts of appeals were “relatively 
faithful agents” of their Supreme Court principal but their responsiveness to Court “did not 
prevent entirely the judges on the courts of appeals from pursuing their own policy 
preferences”). 
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None of this is to say that attention to pathetic argument would have 
reined in the Ninth Circuit in the shaken baby case. But eschewing an 
otherwise effective mode of persuasion complicates the Court’s task as a 
principal. The “cultural script of judicial dispassion”388 encouraged the 
Court to ignore the expressive dimension of the case, which involved 
attaching the enormous social meaning of a potential life term in prison to 
the case of a grandmother who was trying to put her infant grandson to 
sleep.389 The Ninth Circuit panel was quite plausibly affected by this 
dimension but was never engaged on its terms. 
 4. Pathetic Argument as Inevitable. — In the end, the best normative 
case for treating some pathetic arguments as appropriate may simply 
derive from the inevitability of their deployment. This is not, in the main, a 
fatalistic argument that simply gives up on the capacity of human judges to 
perform their jobs professionally. It is, rather, a second-best argument that 
proceeds from the assumption (which I do not hold) that emotional appeal 
would be absent in an ideal world. When an ideal world is unattainable, we 
should ask ourselves how to make the best of its alternative. And the way 
to make the best of a world in which constitutional judges sometimes 
advance pathetic arguments is to develop and support a set of best 
pathetic practices. Treating emotional appeals as forbidden allows them to 
proceed when unnoticed—as when judges embellish the facts in capital 
appeals or augment their own authority by treating legal texts as having 
obvious meanings390—but not when such appeals are transparent, as in 
“Poor Joshua!” As Part III.C discusses below, that pattern does not likely 
map on to the contexts in which pathetic argument is most easily justified. 
 C. When to Be Pathetic 
The reasons why pathetic arguments are sometimes appropriate in 
constitutional law inform the related question of when such arguments are 
appropriate. If convention partly dictates the answer to the normative 
question, it might tell us still more about the contexts in which judges tend 
to make emotional appeals. If democratic considerations particular to the 
nature of constitutional law make pathetic argument necessary to 
constitutional practice, then we will want to attend to the particular 
conditions under which emotional engagement improves democratic 
reflection over the subjects of constitutional cases. Constitutional practice, 
constitutional law, the scope and substance of emotions as an experiential 
category, and the definition of an “appeal” to emotion are sufficiently 
complex that we can safely assume that the normative question is not 
                                                 
388. See Maroney, supra note 4, at 629. 
389. See Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 25, at 605–30 (discussing social 
meanings connotatively expressed through various forms of punishment). 
390. See James Boyd White, Judicial Criticism, 20 Ga. L. Rev. 835, 849–57 (1986) 
(identifying this latter move in Chief Justice Taft’s majority opinion in Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)). 
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binary. It is unlikely to be obvious in any given case whether an emotional 
appeal is in bounds or out, just as it is often unclear whether some deep 
political argument is “constitutional,” or whether a feeling or mood is an 
“emotion.”  
That said, this Part proposes four overlapping considerations that, in 
combination, are relevant to assessing when pathetic arguments are 
appropriate in opinion-writing by constitutional judges. A fifth 
consideration—the subtlety of the appeal—is worth mentioning here only 
so that its relevance may be appropriately qualified. In many instances, a 
pathetic appeal is more likely to succeed if it is not obvious. If an opinion-
writer is to derive good practices from convention, which suggests 
ambivalence toward emotional appeals, he must not ignore the perils of 
the overwrought opinion. But subtlety is surely not the only consideration, 
and it is difficult to derive criteria—independent of subtlety’s capacity to 
persuade in any particular case—that help us to assess its appropriate use 
more generally. Further, as the considerations below suggest, the insights 
derived from convention are not the only ones relevant to the normative 
question. 
 1. Separate Writings. — First, we should care whether the putative 
pathetic argument appears as part of an opinion of a court or whether it is 
part of a separate writing. Pathetic arguments are more likely to be 
appropriate in the latter instance. The reason is partly a matter of 
convention: Pathetic arguments are more common in separate opinions. A 
certain kind of formalism (some would say “sophistry”391 or “legalistic 
argle-bargle”392) has survived both legal realism and critical legal studies; 
its resilience may reflect popular preference as much as inertia,393 and so 
pathetic argument may simply be less persuasive when an opinion 
purports to declare the law.394 But there are also sound theoretical 
reasons for giving greater latitude to concurrences and dissents. An 
opinion that does not speak for the court is typically urging law reform, 
either addressed to colleagues on the bench or addressed to members of 
the political branches. It is uncontroversial, or should be, that law creation 
by political bodies does and should attend at least in part to pathos.395 As 
discussed, it is more controversial that judge-made law should adopt a 
                                                 
391. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
392. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
393. See Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling 
Originalism, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 356, 416 (2011) (noting Americans’ affinity toward “rule of 
law” values). 
394. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing consideration of law declaration in pathetic 
argument). 
395. See supra text accompanying note 94 (opining on impropriety of judicial use of 
pathetic argument); see also Westen, supra note 354, at 117–24 (explaining link between 
emotion and voting behavior); Elizabeth B. Clark, “The Sacred Rights of the Weak”: Pain, 
Sympathy, and the Culture of Individual Rights in Antebellum America, 82 J. Am. Hist. 463, 
475–87 (1995) (describing vivid emotional appeals by American abolitionists). 
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similar focus, but separate opinions in constitutional cases often 
emphasize dimensions of the problem neglected or glossed over by the 
court majority. Once it is conceded that pathetic arguments are part of the 
judge’s toolkit, it must also be conceded that it is at least permissible for a 
separate writing to encourage their use in a particular case. For like 
reasons, pathetic arguments are more likely to be appropriate when 
advanced by litigants or other legal advocates than when advanced by 
judges.396 
 2. Law Declaration. — A second significant and related consideration 
is whether the court’s work is best described as “law-announcing” or “law-
applying.” As between the two, pathetic argument is generally more 
appropriate in opinions written by law-announcing bodies or actors in 
contexts that call for, as Henry Monaghan puts it, “law declaration” rather 
than “dispute resolution.”397 When a court declares the law, its concern is 
with concretizing previously indeterminate legal rules or standards and its 
gaze is fixed on the future rather than the past. Dispute resolution is 
focused on historical rather than legislative facts, on the particular parties 
before the court, and on whether the defendant’s conduct violated a well-
established rule of law.398 No bright line separates these categories at the 
margins but it remains a useful distinction, particularly at the Supreme 
Court. The Court understands itself to be concerned primarily with law 
declaration, as evidenced by its shrinking docket and its codified standard 
for granting certiorari: Rule 10 states that “[a] petition for a writ of 
certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous 
factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”399 
This dichotomy finds a loose parallel in Aristotle’s distinction 
between “deliberative” and “judicial” or “forensic” rhetoric.400 
Deliberative rhetoric is addressed to one who is adjudicating “future 
happenings” such as “[a] member of a democratic assembly,” whereas 
judicial rhetoric is addressed to one who is “judging the past,” such as a 
member of a jury.401 Our general unease in conceding that judges make 
law is grounded in the reality that legitimate construction of legal rules 
and standards requires a careful weighing of competing societal values. A 
judge cannot easily perform this task without making those values 
intelligible through emotional engagement. The notion that a judge might 
                                                 
396. See supra text accompanying notes 74–87 (describing pathetic argument’s role in 
trial advocacy). 
397. Monaghan, supra note 20, at 668. 
398. This distinction may overlap with, but does not neatly track, the distinction 
between facial and as-applied challenges. The Court’s skepticism about entertaining facial 
challenges reflects a reluctance to decide cases not before it, but an as-applied challenge on 
which certiorari is granted may well involve deep uncertainty as to the content of the 
applicable constitutional rule. 
399. Sup. Ct. R. 10. 
400. Aristotle, supra note 1, bk. 1, ch. 3, §§ 3–4. 
401. Id. § 2. 
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make constitutional law is even more unsettling, since his decision 
displaces the democratically enacted laws of the community and the 
democratically accountable actions of its leaders. As Marie Failinger 
writes, the work of the Supreme Court, in particular, “ranges beyond the 
forensic, to deliberative and epideictic tasks necessary in the creation of an 
ongoing constitutional community of trust.”402 Some constitutional 
doctrines invite this kind of value-balancing more than others; consider, 
for example, the “evolving standards of decency” inquiry in the Eighth 
Amendment context,403 or the “shocks the conscience” standard for a due 
process violation.404 
A court that understands itself to be applying established legal rules 
to a common fact situation need not make a judgment nor solicit the 
audience’s judgment as to the values underlying the law or the interplay 
between those values and the particular circumstances of the accused. The 
relevant balancing has already been authoritatively performed. The 
function of an opinion in this context is simply to establish, as a factual 
matter, that the defendant’s conduct cleared or failed to clear a preset bar. 
There is less of a role for prudential arguments, which is why the speeding 
ticket colloquy discussed in Part III.B.2 should not ordinarily find its way 
into an opinion. But as the court’s orientation becomes increasingly 
prospective, we may understand pathetic assessment of a litigant as a 
broader commentary on those similarly situated.405 In proposing law 
reform, it is quite appropriate for a judge to apprise the audience of the 
stakes of the chosen course and potential alternatives.406 Doing so is likely 
to be more effective if pathetic argument is, in some form, on the table. 
This might be particularly so when the legal doctrines at issue rely on 
some conception of expressive harm rather than measurable injury.407 
                                                 
402. Marie A. Failinger, Not Mere Rhetoric: On Wasting or Claiming Your Legacy, 
Justice Scalia, 34 U. Tol. L. Rev. 425, 435 (2003). 
403. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (explaining meaning of phrase 
“cruel and unusual punishment” is not static). 
404. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (explaining “due process of law” 
requires “judgment . . . mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of change in a 
progressive society”). 
405. For this reason, pathetic argument may be more appropriate in cases where 
equitable relief is sought. This consideration likely provides limited independent 
explanatory power at the Supreme Court, where virtually all of the Court’s work is, in a 
sense, prospective. 
406. See Failinger, supra note 402, at 436 (claiming appellate courts have 
responsibility to move audiences toward legal or social reform). 
407. Pathetic argument may therefore have a special role to play in an area that sits 
largely outside of constitutional law and nominally outside of criminal law: assessment of 
punitive damages. Punitive damages are awarded to express the community’s outrage at 
tortious conduct. This expressive dimension may help explain the otherwise puzzling 
constitutional doctrine under which a jury may increase the level of punitive damages based 
on third-party harm only as a measure of the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct 
and not as “direct” punishment for that harm. Compare Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 
U.S. 346, 356–57 (2007) (discussing disagreement between Justice Breyer and Justice 
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Recall, in this regard, the discussion of excited utterances in Part III.A. 
An excited utterance is perhaps more likely than a reflective statement to 
be faithful to the actual perceptions of the accused, but it may be less likely 
to reflect historical fact. The degree to which an emotional appeal is 
appropriate may likewise depend in part on whether the court’s objective 
is to tap into the reader’s subjective perceptions—which are crucial to 
value ordering—or is instead concerned with persuading the reader that 
some set of circumstances with a well-established social meaning did or 
did not obtain. Emotional appeal is more likely to be appropriate in the 
former than the latter style of opinion. 
 3. Promoting Deliberation. — This Article has sought to demonstrate 
that emotion is an unwieldy category of human experience. The diversity 
of emotional states and the diverse contributions that emotions make to 
cognition and judgment are among the reasons why denying a place for 
pathetic argument in constitutional law or constitutional judging is too 
simplistic. The necessary corollary to that observation is that some 
emotions are likely better suited to producing the kind of deliberation that 
is valuable to constitutional law.408 We may believe, for example, that it is 
preferable to conjure emotions that promote reflection about one’s deep 
commitments as against those likely to distract us from those 
commitments. We may likewise wish to support emotions that foster 
other-regarding rather than purely self-regarding judgments and 
perspectives.409 
Aristotle spoke of “emotions of the soul,” such as pity and anger, that 
he believed were “appeals to the juryman” rather than relating to fact,410 
but he did not develop an elaborate taxonomy. The Liber Pantegni, a 
medieval text that remains the oldest known manual of Western medicine, 
used similar terminology—“accidents of the soul”—to describe six 
emotions associated with a physiological response, namely joy, distress, 
fear, anger, anxiety, and shame.411 
Part II.A described William James’s view that emotions generally are a 
conventional label for precisely these kinds of physiological disturbances. 
                                                                                                                 
Stevens over punishment for third-party harm), with id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“This nuance eludes me.”). See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Punitive Damages After 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 44 Ct. Rev. 134, 141 (2008) (discussing disagreement between 
Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens over punishment for third-party harm).  
408. See Maroney, supra note 4, at 651 (advocating “emotional law and economics” 
approach, which “would seek to isolate and control the decisional contexts in which 
emotion . . . predictably leads to suboptimal outcomes”). 
409. I do not mean to endorse either a deliberative or interest-based conception of 
democracy. The elaboration of constitutional law through judicial opinions lacks the 
reciprocity necessary to conform to leading models of appropriate democratic deliberation. 
Articulating the relationship between the content of judicial opinions and well-functioning 
democracy requires considerable work and is beyond this Article’s scope. 
410. Aristotle, supra note 1, bk. 1, ch. 1, § 4. 
411. Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 215 (2004) 
(describing six emotions named in Liber Pantegni). 
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James believed that these kinds of emotions—the “standard emotions” 
such as “[s]urprise, curiosity, rapture, fear, anger, lust, [and] greed”412—
are not aspects of cognition and are not forms of judgment.413 He was 
aware that other cognitive processes exist that bear a resemblance to our 
intuitive understanding of emotion,414 but he insisted that their cognitive 
structure denied them the status of emotion: 
Yes! in every art, in every science, there is the keen perception of 
certain relations being right or not, and there is the emotional 
flush and thrill consequent thereupon. And these are two things, 
not one. In the former of them it is that experts and masters are 
at home. The latter accompaniments are bodily commotions that 
they may hardly feel, but that may be experienced in their fulness 
by Crétins and Philistines in whom the critical judgment is at its 
lowest ebb.415 
Modern cognitivists resist segregating these kinds of judgments from their 
emotional responses and are more apt to describe emotions by reference 
to their feelings and their intentional objects in combination. It is possible, 
then, to use some of James’s examples of objects that inspire both 
judgment and feeling as evidence of his views as to which emotions are 
more “intelligent.” As Andrew Ortony and his coauthors write, “James had 
essentially characterized a range of cognitive content for the emotion-
producing perception from low (e.g., a mother’s delight at the sight of her 
beautiful baby) to high (e.g., the delight of receiving a national honor).”416 
Proceeding in this way, Ortony et al. continue, we can ascribe to James an 
appreciation of the high cognitive content of emotions such as “‘shame, 
desire, regret, etc.’” that are triggered by an appreciation of social 
convention rather than merely instinct.417 
Ortony et al. have usefully generalized their own views in a 
monograph that aims to categorize emotional states according to their 
cognitive content.418 Broadly, they classify emotions (or rather, emotion 
types)419 according to “ingredients of appraisal”: Through emotions, we 
measure events according to their relationship to our goals, we measure 
the actions of agents according to standards of conduct or performance 
                                                 
412. James, supra note 130, at 189. 
413. See id. at 202 (drawing distinction between “standard” emotions and forms of 
cognition and judgment). 
414. See id. at 201 (recognizing “genuinely cerebral forms of pleasure and 
displeasure”). 
415. Id. at 202–03. 
416. Ortony et al., supra note 146, at 5. 
417. Id. (quoting James, supra note 130, at 195). 
418. Id. at 1 (“[O]ur approach will be concerned more or less exclusively with trying to 
characterize the differences between emotions in terms of the different kinds of cognitions 
we take to be responsible for them.”). 
419. Id. at 15 (“An emotion type is a distinct kind of emotion that can be realized in a 
variety of recognizably related forms.”). 
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(for a nonhuman agent), and we measure objects according to attitudes.420 
Within each of these categories we may react positively or negatively, and 
we may assign responsibility for our reaction or assess consequences of 
the event in light of our own projects or purposes or those of someone 
else.421 That is, for any combination of personal identity, valence, and 
ingredient of appraisal we can identify an emotion type, within which lies 
a family of related emotions, the members of which can vary substantially 
in intensity. Thus, a negative valence attached to the consequence of an 
event that is desirable for someone else may be characterized as the 
emotion type of “resentment.”422 If the event is undesirable for someone 
else the emotion type is “pity.”423 If we shift the valence to positive, the 
emotion types are respectively “happy-for” and “gloating.”424 Ortony et al. 
proceed in this way to construct a general taxonomy of emotion. 
This Part began with the suggestion that there is reason to approve 
judicial appeals to emotions that foster deliberation about deep 
commitments and that are other- rather than self-regarding. Using the 
Ortony et al. framework, emotions whose ingredient of appraisal is an 
“attitude” toward some object have a simplistic cognitive structure that is 
less grounded in a deliberative judgment. Ortony et al. view the emotions 
in this category, what he calls the “Attraction” emotions of love and hate, 
as temporary states. As such, and accepting the Ortony et al. taxonomy, the 
normative case in favor of direct appeals to these emotions is weak. 
As to other- versus self-regard, we can refine the inquiry by limiting 
the favored other-regarding emotions to what I will call “positive” other-
regarding emotions. These are emotions that correspond to positively 
valenced event outcomes regarded as desirable by the affected others and 
negatively valenced event outcomes as undesirable by the affected others. 
On the Ortony et al. taxonomy, more approved emotion types would 
therefore include “happy-for,” “pity,” and “admiration,” and less approved 
types would include “resentment” and “gloating.” These latter emotions 
are other-regarding but not in a way that builds community by associating 
others’ ends with one’s own. These emotions are not empathetic, and so 
they double down on the radical subjectivity of emotion that makes 
pathetic argument perilous. 
Specifying the emotions that meet all of these criteria is beyond our 
scope; it is a research agenda all its own. Note as well that the argument 
just described makes normative assumptions about the desirability of 
                                                 
420. Id. at 13 (“We argue that there are three broad classes of emotions that result 
from focusing on one of three salient aspects of the world—events and their consequences, 
agents and their actions, or objects, pure and simple.”). 
421. Id. at 16, 19 (describing structure of theory of emotions and providing graphic 
depiction). 
422. Id. at 19. 
423. Id. 
424. Id. 
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other-regarding behavior that are contestable. Hannah Arendt has 
described the failed political program of the Jacobins as instilling a “virtue” 
that consisted in “identify[ing] one’s own will with the will of the people,” 
and in elevating “compassion to the rank of the supreme political passion 
and of the highest political virtue.”425 An ironic myopia may accompany 
excessive concern for the social as against the personal; we may fail to 
internalize the degree to which others hold different preferences and 
harbor different aspirations. Resentment may breed ingenuity, which is a 
different kind of virtue. The key point for now is not to settle on a catalog 
of favored emotions. It is, rather, that concluding that emotions may vary 
in their degree of subjectivity begins rather than ends the conversation 
about when pathetic argument is appropriate. 
 4. Addressing Constitutional Subjects. — Finally, use of an emotional 
appeal may be more appropriate when, as in the examples from Part II.B, 
the appeal seeks to persuade the reader of the substance or valence of an 
established constitutional subject rather than seeking more directly to 
persuade the reader of a particular adjudicative outcome. George Kennedy 
refers to the case of the great Roman orator Marcus Antonius, who in the 
extortion trial of a war veteran, is said to have “ripped the toga from the 
scarred body of the old soldier to exhibit his wounds” to the jury.426 
Antonius was not well versed in law but, according to Cicero, “[H]e never 
felt the need for it.”427 In the usual course, this will not do for 
constitutional argument. The concerns over the rule of law that counsel 
(too bluntly, I have argued) against pathetic argument are most deeply 
engaged when the argument skips over the usual constitutional forms and 
aims straight for the jugular. 
 IV. THE PAYOFF OF PATHOS 
This Article has situated pathetic argument within constitutional 
practice and has sought to justify its place in light of the nature of 
constitutional law and modern philosophical, psychological, and biological 
insights into the structure and function of emotion in our intellectual life. 
The benefit of clearer understanding in this area is not just epistemic, 
though that would be enough. This Article’s descriptive and normative 
claims enable us to rethink a number of distinct debates within 
constitutional law and practice. This Part highlights three such debates: 
the dispute over the degree to which constitutional law is a unique 
discourse; the role that marginalized conceptions of the good should play 
in constitutional decisionmaking; and the place of sympathy in 
constitutional judging. 
                                                 
425. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution 75 (1965). 
426. George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric 112–13 (1994). 
427. Id. at 113. 
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 A. A Specialized Practical Discourse 
A trenchant disagreement separates attitudinalists and pragmatists 
on one hand and doctrinal constitutional lawyers on the other as to 
whether constitutional law is a specialized discourse or is instead 
continuous with other practical forms.428 Although disputed on the 
margins, mainstream legal and constitutional scholars tend to agree that 
reasoning outside of Bobbitt’s modalities or its equivalent is not 
recognizable as constitutional law and therefore provides at least a modest 
constraint on the set of available outcomes in many (though not all) 
cases.429 The classic attitudinalist position views the modalities as an 
elaborate dress for the policy preferences of the judge, which legal 
reasoning does not meaningfully constrain.430 Posner, representing the 
pragmatist view, concedes that lawyers are specially trained and use a 
particular vernacular but maintains that “there is no intrinsic or 
fundamental difference between how a judge approaches a legal problem 
and how a businessman approaches a problem of production or 
marketing.”431 
This Article’s descriptive claims suggest that, at least in the 
constitutional domain, legal discourse is both specialized and continuous 
with other forms of practical discourse. Constitutional practice focuses on 
particular subjects of argument—text, history, structure, doctrine, and 
institutional consequences—but it does not employ distinct modes of 
persuasion as to the substance or valence of those subjects. The ubiquity of 
resort to those subjects and the substantial number of cases on which legal 
scholars agree as to the outcome quite apart from policy preference 
suggest that the internal norms of constitutional argument exert an 
influence over outcomes.432 But those subjects and norms do not preclude 
                                                 
428. See Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1989, 1994–95 (1996) (noting debate “has dominated political-science scholarship about 
judicial decisionmaking”). 
429. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. Pa. J. 
Const. L. 903, 905 (2005) (describing divergent positions of political scientists and legal 
scholars on constraining force of precedent). See generally Richard S. Markovits, Matters of 
Principle: Legitimate Legal Argument and Constitutional Interpretation 1 (1998) (advancing 
account of “morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture”). 
430. See generally Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the 
Attitudinal Model Revisited 2–3 (2002) (“Although the justices conventionally claim for 
public consumption that they do not make public policy, that they merely interpret law, the 
truth conforms to Chief Justice (then Governor) Charles Evan Hughes’ declaration, ‘We are 
under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is.’”).  
431. Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 73 (2003). 
432. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 975, 1003–04 
(2009) (asserting existence of direct normative constraints on judges and Justices and 
noting substantial percentage of unanimous Supreme Court opinions); Jack Knight & Lee 
Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1018, 1019 (1996) (arguing precedent 
constrains constitutional decisionmaking). 
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a role for pathetic argument as a mode of rhetoric; indeed they may 
require it for their sustenance. 
 B. Pathos and Nomos 
Pathos is both gendered and raced. The rejection of pathetic argument 
is justified by a resistance to the influence of subjectivity on public reason. 
This view reserves the coercive force of the law for pursuit of a common 
good from which radical, lived dissent have been excised.433 As Iris Marion 
Young writes, “Many contemporary theorists of participatory democracy 
retain the ideal of a civic public in which citizens leave behind their 
particularity and differences.”434 Assuming universal reason necessarily 
brands as outsiders those whose experiences and perspectives, aided by 
the intensity of emotion, generate different cognitive judgments.435 
Assimilating that process to the rule of law turns marginalization into 
subjugation.436 
Viewed in this light, Eastman’s defense of “Poor Joshua!” as a beacon 
for his misunderstood and dispossessed clients becomes more pointed.437 
Particularly when used in dissents or concurrences, pathetic argument is a 
vehicle for incorporating marginalized nomoi into the constitutional 
                                                 
433. See Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 97 (1990) (“[T]he 
ideal of impartiality . . . . masks the ways in which the particular perspectives of dominant 
groups claim universality . . . .”). 
434. Id.; cf. Maroney, supra note 4, at 635 (noting derision of emotional judging as 
successor to “Cadi justice,” form of non-Western judicial systems). But see Kathryn Abrams, 
Legal Feminism and the Emotions: Three Moments in an Evolving Relationship, 28 Harv. J.L. 
& Gender 325, 326 (2005) (“Work using emotion as an analytic tool may be premised on a 
foregrounding or prioritization of individual subjectivity, and an insistence on self-
transparency, as well as on static, unitary understandings of women’s circumstances, 
identities, and ways of knowing.”). It is hard not to notice that the recent dust-up over the 
role of empathy in judging revolved around the nomination of a Latina to the Supreme 
Court. Both Latinos and women are typically stereotyped as overly emotional and therefore 
less reasonable. See Mimi Samuel, Focus on Batson: Let the Cameras Roll, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 
95, 95 (2008) (reporting results of lawyer survey focused on juror selection). Justice Alito’s 
discussion of empathy at his confirmation hearing did not receive similar attention. See 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 475 (2006) (statement of J. Samuel A. Alito, Jr.) (“[W]hen a case comes before me 
involving, let’s say, someone who is an immigrant, . . . I can’t help but think of my own 
ancestors . . . . [W]hen I look at those cases, I have to say to myself, and I do . . . , this could be 
your grandfather. This could be your grandmother.”). 
435. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as 
Struggle, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2231, 2252–56 (1992) (discussing perniciousness of universal 
view of objectivity and providing example of one woman’s experience of its effects). 
436. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) 
(“Interpretations in law also constitute justifications for violence which has already 
occurred or which is about to occur.”). 
437. See supra text accompanying note 122; see also Maroney, supra note 4, at 634 
(examining Enlightenment view associating emotion with “common people”). 
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conversation.438 It is telling that, in criticizing Justice Blackmun, Rosen 
compared him to Frank Murphy, “the warmhearted New Dealer who wrote 
emotional dissents on behalf of the poor and powerless, but whose 
tendency to let his heart get the better of his head deprived him of lasting 
influence.”439 Murphy’s thin legacy is surely affected more by the fact that 
he sat for just nine years, dying of a heart condition at the age of fifty-nine. 
But in that brief time he penned one of the most memorable lines of his era 
on the Court, writing that the government’s ancestry-based exclusion of 
free Japanese persons from the West Coast “falls into the ugly abyss of 
racism.”440 A pathetic phrase is worth a volume of logic. 
That said, this Article’s conclusions do not necessarily support 
progressive outcomes. Appeals to emotion obviously have the capacity to 
and will sometimes support populist fears of the other. Moreover, the 
subjects of constitutional argument that invite appeals to emotion are not 
randomly distributed; they seem disproportionately, for example, to 
involve the rights of women and children.441 Discouraging the use of 
pathetic argument wholesale could mitigate the instinct to treat relevantly 
similar cases differently. Emotional appeal seems a sufficiently textured 
rhetorical category that this kind of prophylaxis is unlikely to be effective, 
but readers will differ in the weights they assign the risks on either side. 
 C. In Defense of Sympathy 
Part I.C discusses a common defense to criticism of President Obama’s 
“empathy” standard, namely that critics misunderstand the distinction 
between empathy and sympathy.442 Empathy, some noted, is a perceptive 
capacity, not an emotion.443 But this Article has suggested that there may 
well be contexts in which, whether or not it is appropriate for the judge to 
display or experience sympathy, it may be appropriate for her to seek to 
persuade the reader to be sympathetic. Indeed, Part III.C.3 offered “pity” as 
just the kind of community-building emotion that judges should solicit 
more than others. 
Viewed in the most generous light, “Poor Joshua!” exemplifies this 
kind of rhetoric. It invites the reader to assess the consequences of the 
ruling not just for this Joshua but for Joshuas everywhere; individualizing 
                                                 
438. See generally Cover, Foreword, supra note 27, at 25–40 (exploring how insular 
communities define and give meaning to constitutional principles through distinctive 
normative views). 
439. Rosen, supra note 113, at 13–14. 
440. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
441. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001) (noting controversial 
thermal imaging technology at issue could reveal “at what hour each night the lady of the 
house takes her daily sauna and bath”); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Poor Joshua!”). 
442. See supra Part I.C. 
443. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing perspectives of empathy as 
perceptive capacity). 
1080 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 113:#### 
  
the litigant in this appellate context is not necessarily an invitation to 
“bias” (as in the Antonius example) as much as an invitation to the reader 
to contemplate the societal effects of a rule that imposes little to no duties 
of protection on the state. The reader who accesses his emotions when 
performing that assessment may better appreciate how his values relate to 
those consequences.444 Constitutional opinions that deliberately name 
homicide victims invite the same kind of sympathetic assessment.445 
These examples suggest that the claim that pathos is inappropriate in any 
given case is often an argument internal to constitutional law about which 
values among equally legitimate options should be prioritized. A judge 
undertakes this kind of volatile argument at his peril, but with due respect 
to Federalist No. 78,446 constitutional judging is a perilous business. 
 CONCLUSION 
Our ambivalence about pathetic argument reflects an ambivalence 
about constitutional law itself. Law that claims authority over processes of 
democratic decisionmaking is evidently nonconstitutive in ways that are 
important to liberalism. At a glance, pathetic appeals by judges seem to 
exacerbate this tension by proposing that law be constructed from 
materials that divide rather than bind us. On reflection it should be clear, 
however, that excluding pathetic argument from legal persuasion is 
neither desirable nor possible. Doing so both emasculates constitutional 
argument and unreflectively takes sides in a trenchant debate over the 
nature of constitutional law. Any effort to eliminate pathos from our 
constitutional discourse would systematically bias our evaluation of 
constitutional arguments in favor of the most subtle or least recognized 
emotional appeals. 
Articulating and approving a role for pathetic argument in 
constitutional law supplies a needed amendment to extant descriptions of 
constitutional practice. It makes clear that pathetic arguments are 
continuous with quotidian modes of persuasion outside of constitutional 
discourse while preserving the distinctiveness of constitutional law as 
attending to particular, limited domains of argument. Separating modes of 
persuasion from subjects of argument gives us resources for 
understanding judge-made constitutional law as a practice both of 
                                                 
444. See Benjamin Zipursky, DeShaney and the Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 1101, 1135 (1990) (“The judge who occupies a compassionate stance . . . can provide 
a more thorough interpretation of the law and the facts.”). 
445. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1398 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (naming 
victim); see also Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 1003 (9th Cir. 2007) (reproducing photos 
appended to Cooper v. Brown, No. 04-CV656-H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46232, at *287 (S.D. 
Cal. May 27, 2005) (appending photographs of murder victims to end of capital habeas 
opinion with no obvious analytic purpose)). 
446. See The Federalist No. 78, supra note 249, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he 
judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political 
rights of the Constitution . . . .”). 
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explication and of convincing, and one whose audience extends from the 
judge’s colleagues on the bench all the way out, at times, to the area man. 
Unlike speed limits, constitutional law must govern not only ourselves but 
our posterity,447 and as Bickel wrote at his most perspicacious, “[T]he 
future will not be ruled; it can only possibly be persuaded.”448 
                                                 
447. See U.S. Const. pmbl. 
448. Bickel, supra note 106, at 98. 
